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Abstract 
This dissertation studies the effects of inflation on long-term economic growth and 
economic inequality through the interactions of fiscal and monetary policy. Inflation is 
generated through the faster growth rate of nominal money supply. The fiscal policy in 
discussion includes different tax schedules, productive government spending, unproductive 
government spending, and transfer. Chapter one examines the effects of inflation on the 
distributions of income, earnings, consumption and wealth. We build a dynamic general 
equilibrium model in which consumers differ in terms of their earning abilities and time 
preference. Money is introduced via a generalized cash-in-advance constraint. In the 
quantitative analysis, we first calibrate the model to match the income and wealth 
distributions in the United States, and other key features of the U.S. economy. We then 
conduct a series of counterfactual experiments to quantify the distributional impacts of 
inflation. Chapter two discusses the growth effects of inflation. We build a monetary search 
model with two subperiods. One subperiod captures the frictional, decentralized trading 
and bargaining between buyers and sellers. The other subperiod is the centralized, 
neoclassical growth model. The long-term economic growth is promoted by the productive 
government spending and the growth rate is endogenously determined. More money on the 
one hand generates inflation, and on the other, it facilitates stochastic trading and therefore 
enhances the assets accumulation. Chapter three investigates the question about how the 
property of the progressive tax affects the relationship between economic inequality and 
long-term economic growth. We find that heterogeneity has positive (negative) effects on 
capital accumulation and economic growth if and only if the marginal tax function of the 
progressive tax is concave (convex). 
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1 Anticipated Ination and Economic Inequal-
ity in a Cash-in-Advance Economy
1.1 Introduction
This paper examines the e¤ects of anticipated ination on economic inequality. To achieve
this, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which consumers di¤er in their
earning abilities and subjective discount factors. Money is introduced through a cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint. A calibrated version of the model is able to match the extent
of income and wealth inequality in the United States and replicate certain key features of
the U.S. economy over the period 1960-2010. We then conduct a series of counterfactual
experiments to quantify the impact of ination on di¤erent groups of consumers.
The e¤ects of ination have long been a subject of interest to economists. There is
now a large number of studies which explore the empirical and theoretical linkages between
ination and aggregate economic activities. Theoretical studies on the real e¤ects of ination
include Tobin (1965), Sidrauski (1967), Stockman (1981), Wang and Yip (1992), and Suen
and Yip (2005) among many others.1 These existing studies, however, typically consider an
environment in which consumers are identical and thus ignore the distributional e¤ects of
ination. The present study departs from this literature by considering an environment in
which consumers are ex ante heterogeneous. Our approach thus di¤ers from ·Imrohoro¼glu
(1992), Erosa and Ventura (2002) and Camera and Chien (2014), which have examined
the distributional e¤ects of ination in an environment in which consumers are ex post
1Empirical studies on the relationship between ination and economic growth include Kormendi and
Meguire (1985), De Gregorio (1993), Bullard and Keating (1995), Bruno and Easterly (1998) among many
others.
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heterogeneous (i.e., they experience di¤erent realizations of idiosyncratic shocks). Existing
studies show that predetermined factors are at least as important as idiosyncratic shocks in
explaining cross-sectional variation among consumers [see, for instance, Keane and Wolpin
(1997) and Huggett et al. (2011)]. In the present study, we consider an environment in which
consumers di¤er in their earning abilities and time preference. Using these two sources of
consumer heterogeneity, our model is able to match the observed patterns of wealth and
income inequality in the United States. This is not the rst study that makes use of time
preference heterogeneity to explain economic inequality.2 In the literature of incomplete-
market models, Krusell and Smith (1998) and Hendricks (2007) show that introducing this
type of heterogeneity can generate a substantial concentration of wealth at the top end of
the wealth distribution. In the neoclassical growth literature, Suen (2014) shows that time
preference heterogeneity, together with a direct preferences for wealth, can lead to a high
concentration of wealth. In Suens (2014) model, the direct preferences for wealth prevent
the wealth distribution from collapsing into a degenerate distribution.3 In the present study,
a progressive tax structure is used to serve this purpose. The same approach is also used in
Sarte (1997) and Li and Sarte (2001).
Our main results show that an increase in money growth rate (and long-run ination)
will in general lower the inequality in real money holdings and consumption. This is the
result of two e¤ects. First, an increase in ination raises the cost of holding real money
balances. Holding other things constant, this will discourage the consumers from holding
money, which will in turn suppress consumption through the CIA constraint. Second, a
2There is ample empirical evidence showing that consumers discount future values at di¤erence rates. For
a detailed review of these evidence, see Frederick et al. (2002) Section 6.
3Becker (1980) shows that in the standard neoclassical model where consumers have time-additive pref-
erences and di¤erent subjective discount factors, all the wealth in the economy with eventually be owned by
the most patient consumers.
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faster money growth rate also means that more real money balances is transferred to the
consumers. This will create a pure income e¤ect which promotes consumption. For relatively
poor consumers, the transfers represent a sizable portion of their income. Hence, an increase
in ination rate will induce them to have more consumption. But for the relatively a­ uent
consumers, the negative e¤ect of ination dominates. These two forces together lead to a
more equal distribution of consumption as ination increases.
The present study is similar in spirit to Erosa and Ventura (2002), Heer and Süssmuth
(2007), Camera and Chien (2014). Erosa and Ventura (2002) also show that when ina-
tion increases, the distribution of wealth becomes more unequal, but their mechanism is
di¤erent from ours. They emphasize the heterogeneity in transaction patterns and portfolio
holdings across individuals through costly credit transactions as an alternative to monetary
transactions. In their model, ination is e¤ectively a regressive consumption tax. They
only discuss about the high-income and low-income families and therefore do not match the
entire income and wealth distributions as we do in this paper. Heer and Süssmuth (2007)
stress the heterogeneity in optimal portfolio holding across individuals and they explain the
mechanism through Fredstein channel and stock market transaction costs. Higher ination,
due to Fredstein channel, increases real tax burden and due to the associated costs, widens
the wealth disparity between the wealth-poor and the wealth-rich. But they didnt look
at the distributional e¤ects on income and earnings. Camera and Chien (2014) consider
an incomplete-market environment in which money is used for self-insurance purpose. In
the benchmark model where money is the only asset available for self-insurance against
earning risks, an increase in the ination rate will reduce wealth inequality and raise con-
sumption inequality. When bond is introduced as a competing asset, an increase in ination
will lower consumption inequality and increase wealth inequality. Similar to the standard
3
incomplete-market model, their model has di¢ culty in matching the actual extent of the
wealth inequality observed in the data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment
and dene the competitive equilibrium. Section 3 describes the benchmark parameter values
that we use in the quantitative exercise. Section 4 presents the results from the benchmark
model and the counterfactual experiments. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Consumers
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of innitely-lived consumers. These con-
sumers are di¤erent in terms of their innate characteristics. Specically, there are S > 1
di¤erent types of consumers. Each type i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg is identied by a pair of xed pre-
determined characteristics (i; "i) ; where i 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor and
"i > 0 is labor productivity. Consumers within the same group are identical in all aspects.
The share of type-i consumers in the population is given by i 2 (0; 1) : The size of total
population is constant over time and is normalized to one so that
PS
i=1 i = 1:
There is a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and
investment. In each period, each consumer is endowed with one unit of time which can be
divided between labor and leisure. The consumers preferences are given by
1X
t=0
tiu(ci;t; li;t);
where ci;t is the consumption of a type-i consumer at time t, and li;t denotes his labor hours.
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The period utility function is assumed to be additively separable in its arguments, i.e.,
u(c; l) = ln c  A l
1+'
1 + '
;
where ' > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and A > 0 is a constant.4
In each period, each consumer receives two types of taxable income: labor income from
work and interest income from non-monetary assets. Let wt be the wage rate for an e¤ective
unit of labor at time t: Then the labor income for a type-i consumer at time t is given by
wt"ili;t: Let ai;t be the non-monetary assets owned by a type-i consumer at the beginning
of time t; and let rt be the rate of return. Then he receives an interest income of rtai;t at
time t: The sum of these two sources of incomes, denoted by yi;t  wt"ili;t + rtai;t; is subject
to a progressive income tax. The total amount of income tax that a type-i consumer has
to pay at time t is  t (yi;t) ; where  t : R+ ! R+ is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly convex function that satises  t (0) = 0 for all t  0: In each period,
each consumer can accumulate wealth in the form of non-monetary assets and money. Let
Mi;t denote the nominal money holding of a type-i consumer at the beginning of time t, and
let Pt be the general price level. The consumers budget constraint at time t is then given
by
ci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t + t+1mi;t+1  mi;t = yi;t    t(yi;t) + i;t;
where mi;t  Mi;t=Pt is the real money balances, t+1  Pt+1=Pt is the growth factor of the
general price level, and i;t is a lump-sum real money transfer from the government. Similar
to Dotsey and Sarte (2000), we assume that money is required for consumption purchases as
4It is well known that if the period utility function is additively separable in consumption and labor, then
the utility function of consumption must be logarithmic in order to be consistent with balanced growth.
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well as investment. In particular, the consumers are subject to the following cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint in every period,
ci;t + (ai;t+1   ai;t)  mi;t;
where  2 [0; 1] : If  = 0; then money is only required for consumption purchases. This
specication is often referred to as the Clower (1967) CIA constraint. If  = 1; then money
is required for both consumption purchases and investment. This specication is rst intro-
duced by Stockman (1981). In the present study, we consider the general case in which 
can take any value between zero and one.
Given prices and government policies, the consumersproblem is to choose a sequence of
consumption, labor hours, non-monetary assets and real money balances so as to maximize
his lifetime utility, subject to the sequential budget constraints and the CIA constraints.
Formally, this is given by
max
fci;tli;t;ai;t+1;mi;t+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tiu(ci;t; li;t)
subject to
ci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t + t+1mi;t+1  mi;t = yi;t    t(yi;t) + i;t; (1)
ci;t + (ai;t+1   ai;t)  mi;t; (2)
ai;t+1  0; mi;t+1  0; li;t 2 [0; 1] ;
and the initial conditions: ai;0  0 and mi;0  0:
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Set up the Lagrangian for the consumers problem
L =
1X
t=0
ti

u(ci;t; li;t) +  i;t[yi;t    t(yi;t) + i;t   ci;t   ai;t+1 + ai;t   t+1mi;t+1 +mi;t]
+i;t[mi;t   ci;t   (ai;t+1   ai;t)]g ;
where  i;t and i;t are the Lagrangian multipliers for (68) and (69), respectively. The rst-
order conditions for an interior solution are given by
c 1i;t =  i;t + i;t; (3)
Al'i;t =  i;twt"i[1   0t (yi;t)]; (4)
 i;t + i;t = i

 i;t+1
 
1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1 + 1

+ i;t+1
	
; (5)
t+1 i;t = i
 
 i;t+1 + i;t+1

: (6)
Using (70) and (71), we can obtain
 i;t = i (t+1ci;t+1)
 1 ; (7)
i;t = c
 1
i;t   i (t+1ci;t+1) 1 : (8)
Note that the CIA constraint is binding at time t if i;t > 0: As we will see later on, this
condition is always satised in any balanced-growth equilibrium. Substituting (74) into (72)
gives the optimality condition for labor hours
Al'i;t =
iwt"i [1   0t (yi;t)]
t+1ci;t+1
: (9)
7
The intuition behind this condition is as follows. Suppose a type-i consumer wants to
increase his labor supply at time t from li;t to li;t + ; where  > 0 is innitesimal. On
one hand, such an increase will lower his current utility by Al'i;t units. On the other hand,
this will raise the after-tax labor income by wt"i [1   0t (yi;t)] : This allows the consumer
to hold wt"i [1   0t (yi;t)] =t+1 more units of mi;t+1, which can then be used to purchase
consumption at time t+1: Thus, the discounted marginal benets of increasing labor supply
at time t is given by iwt"i [1   0t (yi;t)] =t+1ci;t+1: In the optimal situation, these marginal
benets are equated to the marginal costs.
Using (73)-(75), we can obtain

ci;t
=
i
ci;t+1

  1  
t+1

+
(i)
2
t+2ci;t+2

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1 + 1  
	
; (10)
which is the Euler equation for consumption. A detailed derivation of this equation can be
found in the Appendix. Equation (78) equates the marginal costs of having an additional
unit of non-monetary asset at time t to its discounted marginal benets. The intuition of
this equation can best be explained by considering two special cases:  = 0 and  = 1.
When  = 0, the Euler equation becomes
1
t+1ci;t+1
=
i
t+2ci;t+2

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1 + 1
	
: (11)
Suppose a type-i consumer wants to increase his future asset holdings ai;t+1 by  > 0
units. In order to balance his budget, the consumer will have to simultaneously lower
mi;t+1 by (=t+1) : 5 Through the CIA constraint at time t + 1; this will lower ci;t+1
5Under the Clower CIA constraint, current consumption ci;t is determined by the current real money
holdings mi;t, which is predetermined in the previous period. Hence, the consumer cannot adjust his current
consumption in this scenario.
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by the same amount, which will in turn lower future utility by (t+1ci;t+1)
 1 : On the
other hand, the increase in future asset holdings will generate an after-tax gross return of
1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1 + 1
	
: These additional resources will allow the consumer to increase
mi;t+2 and ci;t+2 by

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1 + 1
	
=t+2: The expression on the right-hand
side of (11) is the discounted marginal benets generated by the increase in ai;t+1:
When  = 1; the Euler equation becomes
1
ci;t
=
i
ci;t+1
+
(i)
2
t+2ci;t+2

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1
	
;
In this case, the sequential budget constraint and the CIA constraint at time t can be
rewritten as
t+1mi;t+1 = yi;t    t(yi;t) + i;t;
and
ci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t = mi;t:
Suppose a type-i consumer wants to increase his future asset holdings ai;t+1 by  > 0 units.
In order to maintain the CIA constraint, the consumer has to lower ci;t by the same amount,
which in turn lowers his current utility by (=ci;t) : The increase in ai;t+1 has two positive
e¤ects. First, by the CIA constraint at time t+ 1; an increase in ai;t+1 allows the consumer
to have more ci;t+1: This will raise his lifetime utility by (i=ci;t+1) : Second, the increase in
ai;t+1 will raise his future after-tax incomes by

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1; which allows him to in-
creasemi;t+2 by

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1=t+2: This can be used to support more consumption
at time t+2; which will then increase lifetime utility by (i)
2 1   0t+1 (yi;t+1) rt+1	 = (t+2ci;t+2) :
In the optimal situation, the discounted marginal benets from these two e¤ects must be
balanced by the corresponding marginal costs.
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1.2.2 Production Function
On the supply side of the economy, there is a large number of identical rms. In each period,
each rm hires labor and rents physical capital from the competitive factor markets, and
produces output according to a production technology
Yt = K

t (XtNt)
1 H%t ;  2 (0; 1) and 1   > % > 0;
where Yt denotes output at time t, Kt denotes capital input, Nt denotes labor input, Xt
is a labor-augmenting technological factor, and Ht is the infrastructure capital provided by
the government. The technological factor is assumed to grow at a constant exogenous rate
so that Xt  t for all t; where   1 and X0 is normalized to one. Both Xt and Ht are
taken as exogenously given by the rms. Since the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale in private inputs (i.e., Kt and Nt), we can focus on the choices made by a
single representative rm. Let Rt be the rental price of physical capital at time t. Then the
representative rm solves the following problem
max
Kt;Nt

Kt (XtNt)
1 H%t   wtNt  RtKt
	
;
and the rst-order conditions are
Rt = K
 1
t (XtNt)
1 H%t ; and wt = (1  )XtKt (XtNt) H%t : (12)
Let  2 (0; 1) be the depreciation rate of physical capital. Then the rate of return from
non-monetary assets rt is given by rt = Rt   .
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1.2.3 Government
The government in this economy implements both scal and monetary policies. In terms of
monetary policies, the nominal supply of money
 
M
s
t

is assumed to grow at a deterministic
time-invariant rate  > 0 in every period, so thatM
s
t+1 = (1+)M
s
t , for all t  0. A fraction
$ 2 (0; 1] of the newly printed money (i.e., seigniorage) is distributed to the consumers
through the lump-sum transfer, so that
Pt
SX
i=1
ii;t = $
 
M
s
t+1  M
s
t

= $M
s
t : (13)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that each type of consumer receives a xed proportion
of the seigniorage revenue in each period, so that Pti;t = i$M
s
t and
PS
i=1 ii = 1: The
rest of the seigniorage revenue is used to support government expenditures.
As for scal policies, following Guo and Lansing (1998) and Li and Sarte (2004), we
assume that the progressive tax function is given by
 t(yt) = et(yt)1+{; (14)
where { is a positive constant, and et > 0 is a time-varying parameter. Under this speci-
cation, the average tax rate (ATR) and the marginal tax rate (MTR) faced by a consumer
with total taxable income yt are given by
ATR   t(yt)
yt
= et(yt){; and MTR  d t(yt)dyt = (1 + {)et(yt){:
Hence, the degree of progressivity, dened as the ratio between the marginal tax rate and
11
the average tax rate is given by (1 + {); i.e.,
Degree of Progressivity =
MTR
ATR
= 1 + {:
The government is required to balance its budget in each period. In particular, all the tax
revenues collected by the government, together with a fraction (1 $) of the seigniorage
revenue, are spent on infrastructure investment (It) and unproductive government spending
(Gt) : The governments budget constraint at time t is given by
It +Gt =
SP
i=1
i t(yi;t) + (1 $)
 
M
s
t+1  M
s
t
Pt
!
; for all t  0: (15)
The stock of infrastructure capital then evolves according to
Ht+1 = It + (1  )Ht; for all t  0: (16)
Finally, we assume that a fraction v 2 (0; 1] of aggregate output is used as unproductive
government spending in every period, i.e., Gt = vYt; for all t  0:
1.2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
To dene a competitive equilibrium, we rst dene ct = (c1;t; c2;t; :::; cS;t), lt = (l1;t; l2;t; :::; lS;t),
at = (a1;t; a2;t; :::; aS;t), mt = (m1;t;m2;t; :::;mS;t) and t =
 
1;t; 2;t; :::; S;t

as the cross-
sectional distributions of consumption, labor hours, non-monetary assets, real money hold-
ings and lump-sum transfers at time t: The exogenous policy instruments in this economy in-
clude a sequence of progressive tax functions f t ()g1t=0 ; and the parameters

;$; v; 1; :::; S
	
:
Given these policy instruments, a competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of se-
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quences of distributions fct; lt; at;mtg1t=0, aggregate inputs fKt; Ntg1t=0, policy variables
fM st ; It; tg1t=0, and prices fwt; rt; Rt; Ptg1t=0, such that
(i) Given prices and government policies, the allocation fci;t; li;t; ai;t+1;mi;t+1g1t=0 solves a
type-i consumers problem.
(ii) Given prices and infrastructure capital, the aggregate inputs fKt; Ntg1t=0 solve the
representative rms problem in every period.
(iii) The governments budget is balanced in every period, i.e., (43) holds. Nominal money
supply is determined by M
s
t+1 = (1 + )M
s
t :
(iv) All markets cleared in every period, i.e.,
Kt =
SX
i=1
iai;t; Nt =
SX
i=1
i"ili;t and M
s
t = Pt
SX
i=1
imi;t, for all t:
Balanced Growth Equilibrium In the following analysis, we conne our attention to
balanced-growth equilibria. A balanced-growth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium
that satises the following additional conditions:
(i) The real rate of return from capital is constant over time, i.e., rt = r > 0 for all t:
(ii) The supply of labor by each consumer is constant over time, i.e., li;t = li 2 (0; 1) for
all t and for all i:
(iii) The average tax rate and the marginal tax rate faced by the consumers are constant
over time.
(iv) All other variables are growing at the same constant factor :
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The common growth factor  can be derived as follows. Suppose condition (i) is satised,
i.e., rt = r > 0 for all t: Using (79), we can get
K 1t (XtNt)
1 H%t = r
 + :
SinceNt is constant in any balanced-growth equilibrium, the above condition holds ifK 1t Xt
1 H%t
is constant over time, i.e.,
K 1t X
1 
t H
%
t = K
 1
t+1 X
1 
t+1 H
%
t+1
)

Xt+1
Xt
1 
= 1  =

Kt+1
Kt
1 
Ht
Ht+1
%
= 1  %
)  =  1 1  %  1:
Conditions (i) and (iii) in the above denition require that the after-tax return from capital,
i.e.,

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1; is time-invariant in a balanced-growth equilibrium.6 This can be
achieved by setting et   (t) { for all t  0: Under this specication, the average tax rate
and the marginal tax rate faced by a consumer with total taxable income yt are now given
by
ATR = 

yt
t
{
; and MTR = (1 + {)

yt
t
{
:
In these expressions, we have essentially removed the growth trend t from the income
variable. Hence, the resulting average tax rate and marginal tax rate are time-invariant in
any balanced-growth equilibrium. Condition (iv) in the above denition implies that all the
aggregate variables, including wt; Kt; Ht and
 
M
s
t=Pt

; will share the same growth trend t
6Note that, cross-sectionally, di¤erent types of consumers with di¤erent levels of taxable income will face
a di¤erent after-tax return from capital in the balanced-growth equilibrium.
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in any balanced-growth equilibria. Hence, we can write each of these variables in terms of
the common trend and their detrended counterpart, i.e., wt  t bw; Kt  tbk; Gt  tbg;
and
 
M
s
t=Pt
  t bm; where nbw;bk; bg; bmo is a set of stationary values that needs to
be determined. Similarly, all the individual variables, including ci;t; ai;t; mi;t; i;t and yi;t;
will share the same growth trend t in any balanced-growth equilibria, so that ci;t  tbci ;
ai;t  tbai ; mi;t  t bmi ; i;t  tbi ; and yi;t  tbyi for all i: The set of stationary valuesnbci ;bai ; bmi ;bi ; byioS
i=1
are also endogenously determined in the balanced-growth equilibrium.
We now outline the steps for computing a balanced-growth equilibrium.7 For given value
of r; we can solve for the value of by  fby1; by2; :::; bySg using
 =
i


  1  


+
1


i

2
f[1  (1 + ) (byi ){] r + 1  g ; (17)
where   (1 + ) = is the growth factor of the general price level in the balanced-growth
equilibrium. Equation (17) can be obtained from the Euler equation in (78). Once by is
determined, the value of
nbh; bw;bk; N; bmo can be obtained by solving
( +    1)bh + v (r + )

bk = SX
i=1
i(byi )1+{ + (1 $)bm: (18)
bw = (1  ) 
r + 
 
1  bh %1  ; (19)
bk = 
PS
i=1 ibyi 
r + (1  )  ; (20)
N =

r + 

bh % 11  bk; (21)
7A detailed derivation of the equations mentioned below can be found in the Appendix.
15
bm = 1
1 + (1 $)
(
SX
i=1
ibyi [1  (byi ){]  (1  )(   1)bk
)
: (22)
Equation (46) follows from the governments budget constraint and the law of motion for
infrastructure capital. Equations (47)-(49) can be obtained by combining the rst-order
conditions in (79). For each i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; the value of fbci ;bai ; bmi; li g can be obtained by
solving
byi = "i bwli + rbai ;
bci +  (   1)bai = bmi;
A(li )
' =
1


i

 bw"ibci [1  (1 + {)(byi ){]; (23)
bci + (   1)bai + bmi = byi [1  (byi ){] + i$bm: (24)
Equation (51) follows immediately from the rst-order condition in (76). Equation (24) is
the consumers budget constraint along the balanced growth path. Finally, we need to make
sure that the distribution of individual asset holdings fba1;ba2; :::;baSg is consistent with the
aggregate variable bk obtained from (48). To achieve this, we will need to solve for the value
of r that clears the market for physical capital, i.e.,
bk = SX
i=1
ibai :
1.3 Calibration
The main purpose of the numerical analysis is to quantify the e¤ects of monetary policy
based on the model developed above. To this end, we rst construct a parameterized version
of the model and show that it is able to replicate certain features of the U.S. economy. The
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benchmark parameter values are summarized in Table 1. Some of these values are chosen
based on empirical evidence. Others are chosen to match certain real-world statistics. The
details of this procedure are explained below.
One period in the model is one year. The share of capital income in total output () is
0.36. The value of % is set to 0.20, which matches the empirical estimates reported in Glomm
and Ravikumar (1997). The Frisch elasticity of labor supply (1=') is set to 0.40, which is
consistent with the empirical estimates obtained by MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986). As
explained earlier, the degree of progressivity (1 + {) can be measured by the ratio between
the average income tax rate and the marginal income tax rate. Using TAXSIM data over
the period 1960-2010, we obtain an estimate of 1.877 for the degree of progressivity, which
means { = 0:877:8 As for the parameter  in the CIA constraint, Dotsey and Sarte (2000)
suggest that for industrialized countries with well-developed nancial markets (such as the
U.S. and other OECD countries), the fraction of investment that requires cash is likely to
be close to zero. Hence, we set  = 0 in our benchmark model. We also set $ = 1 and
i = 1 for all i in the benchmark model so that all the seigniorage is distributed evenly to
the consumers.
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match some targeted statistics. First, the
growth factor of the technological factor () is chosen so that the common growth rate
(   1) is 2.06%, , which matches the average annual growth rate of real per-capita U.S.
GDP over the period 1960-2010. Given  = 0:36 and  = 0:20; the required value of 
is 1.0141. Second, the benchmark money growth rate () is chosen so that the ination
8Data on the average federal income tax rates and the marginal federal income tax rates in the United
States over the period 1960-2010 are available from the website: http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/allyup/xed-
ally.html. We choose to use the data based on a xed 1984 sample of taxpayers. To get the value of {; we
rst compute the ratio between the average tax rate and the marginal tax rate for each year and then take
the average over the entire sample period.
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rate (   1) is 4.07%, which matches the average annual growth rate of the Consumer
Price Index over the period 1960-2010. Given  = 1:0206; the required value of  is 6.21%.
Third, individuals subjective discount factors and labor productivity are chosen to match
the distributions of wealth and income in the United States. We use the data from the
2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) as reported in Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011). In the
quantitative analysis, we partition the population in the model economy into ten groups,
i.e., S = 10: This partition is intended to mimic the income groups reported in Table 5
of Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011). The only di¤erence is that we have discarded the bottom
1% of the income distribution, which has a negative average income in the SCF data.9
Hence, the rst group in our model represents the bottom 1-5% of the income distribution
and the tenth group represents the top 1%.10 The average income and average wealth for
group i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg in the balanced-growth equilibrium are given by byi and (bai + bmi ),
respectively. In the calibration procedure, we compute the value of

1; 2; :::; S 1
	
so that
the income ratios fbyi =bySgS 1i=1 match the values reported in Table 5 of Díaz-Giménez et al.
(2011). Similarly, the labor productivity parameters f"2; "3; :::; "Sg are computed so that
wealth ratios f(bai + bmi ) = (ba1 + bm1)gSi=2 match their real-world counterparts. The value of
"1 is set to 0:1.11
Five parameters remain undetermined up to this point, these include the preference
parameter A; the depreciation rate of physical capital ; the subjective discount factor for the
top 1% of the income distribution S; a scale parameter in the progressive tax function  and
the share of aggregate output used as unproductive government spending v: These parameters
9The consumers in our model economy will never have a negative before-tax income.
10The other groups represent the 5-10%, 10-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80%, 80-90%, 90-95%, 95-99% of
the income distribution.
11This normalization is innocuous. The same results can be obtained if we set "S = 1 and choose the value
of f"1; "2; :::; "S 1g so as to match the observed value of f(bai + bmi ) = (ba1 + bm1)gS 1i=1 :
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are chosen so that the benchmark balanced-growth equilibrium has the following features:
First, the average time spent on working is about one-third, i.e.,
PS
i=1 il

i = 0:33: Second,
the capital-output ratio is 3.0. Third, the ratio of total tax receipts to aggregate output
is 7.8%, which matches the U.S. data over the period 1960-2010.12 Fourth, unproductive
government spending accounts for about 67.5% of all the government spending.13 Fifth, the
long-run rate of return from physical capital (r) is 6%.
1.4 Findings
This section reports the main ndings obtained from the numerical analysis. In Section 4.1,
we summarize the main properties of the benchmark equilibrium. In Section 4.2, we present
the results obtained from a series of counterfactual policy experiments. The purpose of these
experiments is to quantify the e¤ects of ination on economic inequality.
1.4.1 Benchmark Economy
Major Economic Variables Table 2 summarizes the key statistics in our benchmark
economy and compares them to their empirical counterparts. Apart from the ve targeted
statistics, our model is also able to match quite well the average value of the consumption-
output ratio in the United States over the same time period.
12To compute this value, we rst obtain data on the personal current taxes received by the U.S. federal
government over the period 1960-2010. These data are available from the National Income and Product
Accounts. We then compute the ratio between these tax revenues and US GDP. The average value over the
sample period is 7.8%.
13According to the NIPA data, consumption expenditures made by the U.S. federal government accounted
for about 67.5% of all its nondefense expenditures over the period 1960-2010. The rest was used as gross
investment in structures and equipments.
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Economic Inequality Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the earnings, income
and wealth distributions obtained under the benchmark parameter values. The rst column
reports the Gini coe¢ cient of the three variables and compares them to the actual data.
The rest of the table shows the share of earnings, income and wealth held by consumers in
di¤erent percentiles of the corresponding distribution. Since we have discarded the bottom
1% of the income distribution, it is not surprising that the extent of inequality generated by
the model tends to be lower than that observed in the data. Nonetheless, our model is able
to replicate the high concentration of wealth and income observed in the U.S. economy. For
instance, in our benchmark economy, the top 1% of the wealth distribution owns about 26%
of total wealth, and the top 1% of the income distribution owns about 21% of total income.
These values are identical to those in the actual data.
Table 4 shows that share of wealth held in the form of money across di¤erent groups of
consumers. Overall, income-poor and wealth-poor consumers tend to hold a larger fraction
of their wealth as real money balances. This happens because poor consumers tend to spend
a larger fraction of their income on consumption. Since consumption purchases require the
use of money under the CIA constraint, this in turn generates a strong demand for money
among the poor.
1.4.2 Policy Experiments
Distributional E¤ect of Ination: Case I (Benchmark Economy) To gauge the
e¤ects of anticipated ination on economic inequality, we conduct a series of counterfactual
experiments by changing the growth factor of nominal money supply (i.e., ) in the bench-
mark economy. In particular, a higher money growth rate would imply a higher ination
rate in the long-run equilibrium. Since we calibrate our model to the U.S. economy, we only
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consider episodes of relatively mild ination, namely 2%, 4:07% (benchmark), 5%, and 10%:
The associated value of  are 4:10%; 6:21%, 7:16% and 12:27%;respectively. To analyze other
countries with hyperination, we need to recalibrate the model before we can conduct these
experiments. In the policy experiments for our benchmark model, we compute the long-run
equilibrium for each value of ; holding all other parameters constant. The resulting dis-
tributions of wealth, earnings, consumption (or equivalently real money balances), after-tax
income, non-monetary assets holding, labor supply along with the Gini coe¢ cients for the
rst ve distributions are reported in Tables 5-10. Our results indicate that, as ination rate
increases, the distributions of (after-tax) income, earnings and non-monetary assets holding
are becoming more equal and distributions of wealth, consumption and real money balances
are becoming more unequal.
In the following discussion, we will refer to those in the bottom 1-5% of the (before-tax)
income distribution as the poorest, and those who are in the 5-50% of the same distribution
as the poor. Similarly, we will refer to the top 1% of the income distribution as the richest
and those who are in the 50-99% of the income distribution as the rich.
In our experiments, we nd that when ination increases, wage rate increases while the
interest rate is almost unchanged14 for the benchmark model and non-monetary assets hold-
ing drops for all groups. Although the levels of non-monetary assets holding are dramatically
di¤erent across groups under certain ination rate, the decreases across groups are not that
dramatic as ination increases. Even when ination goes up from 4:07% to 10%; the Gini
coe¢ cient just changes from 0:7083 to 0:7106. Since the interest rate doesnt change much,
the change in interest income across groups largely reects the change in consumers non-
monetary assets holding.
14Equilibrium interest rate decreases from 6:2000% under 4:07% ination to 6:1970% under 10% ination.
And this causes all groups hold less non-monetary assets when ination increases.
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Table 10 shows that an increase in the ination rate will generate substantial distortions
in the consumers labor supply. In general, such an increase will discourage labor supply for
all types of consumers. The reduction among the poor, however, is much larger. According
to equation (51), a higher ination rate will create a direct negative e¤ect on labor supply.
But an increase in ination also tends to lower individual income (hence the marginal tax
rate) and raise the wage rate, which will promote labor supply. Our results in Table 10 thus
suggest that these indirect e¤ects are dominated by the direct e¤ect under the benchmark
parameter values. Since consumption are lower for the rich and the richest and higher for the
poorest and the poor under high ination, and again labor supply decreases for all groups,
so e¤ect of consumption is not the main reason for the shorter hours either. Notice that
the reduction in labor hours is larger for the lower half of the income distribution. This
can be attributed to two factors: the opposite changes in consumption for the poor and the
rich when ination increases, and the magnitude of wage rate e¤ect is related to consumers
predetermined characteristics.
As for earnings, the increase in the e¤ective wage, bw"i; for the poorest, the poor, and
even the rich is dominated by the decrease in individual labor supply, so their earnings
decrease as ination increases. For the richest, due to their high labor productivity (Table
1b), the e¤ective wage e¤ect dominates, and thus their earnings increases. The decrease
in the earnings for all below-top-1% consumers reaches the peak around the middle of the
distribution, but the lower half has even more decrease in their earnings than the upper
half, so the distribution of earnings becomes more unequal as ination increases, as shown
in Table 6. Similar patterns, but in opposite direction, are observed when there is a decline
in the ination rate (from 4:07% to 2%):
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When ination increases, the before-tax income15 as well as the tax payment decrease for
all groups. Since the former decreases more than the latter, the after-tax income decreases
for all groups. The changes in after-tax income across groups are very close. Therefore the
distribution becomes a little unequal as shown in Table 8.
With the parameter values in our benchmark model, the budget constraint in (24) can
be rewritten as (1 + )ci = y

i   (yi )   (   1)ai + m: As ination increases, for most
of the groups (except the top 1% group), the e¤ect of less saving on non-monetary assets
is dominated by the e¤ect of decreasing after-tax income. Across groups, the change in
yi   (yi )   (   1)ai reaches its peak around the middle of the distribution. This change
across groups is then adjusted by the faster growth rate of money supply, y

i (yi ) ( 1)ai
1+
:The
e¤ect of decreasing value of real money is so powerful that all groups tend to decrease their
consumption. Since the relatively a­ uent consumers have more resources left from after-tax
income minus saving, the richer they are, the more their consumption is a¤ected by the mon-
etary policy, i.e. how much the negative e¤ect of higher  a¤ect the groups consumption
depends on the level of their after-tax, after-saving resources, rather than the change of it.
Meanwhile, all groups will receive an equal lump-sum transfer from seigniorage. This cre-
ates a pure income e¤ect which promotes consumption. The overall e¤ects on consumption
depend on the consumers position in the income distribution. For the relatively poor con-
sumers, especially those in the lower half of the income distribution, the lump-sum transfers
represent a sizable portion of their income. Consequently, an increase in transfer will induce
them to have more consumption and hold more real money. But for those in the upper half
of the income distribution, the negative e¤ect dominates. As a result, the relatively a­ uent
15When  = 0; equation (17) becomes 1 = (i )f[1 (1+)(yi )]r+1g: Before-tax income is determined
by parameters,  and equilibrium interest rate. In the experiment, r doesnt change much here under high
ination, so is yi :
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consumers will choose to have fewer consumption and hold less money. These two forces
together lead to a more equal distribution of consumption and real money balance, as is
shown in Table 7.
Since both non-monetary assets holding and real money balances for the rich and the
richest decrease as ination increases, their wealth shrinks a lot. For the lower half of the
income distribution, the two assets adjust in the opposite directions, and their wealth doesnt
change too much. Therefore, the wealth distribution becomes equalizing. We can tell by
Table 4, money holding counts as rather an important share of the wealth for the poor, so the
increase in their money holding dominates the decrease in their non-monetary assets holding
and their wealth is increasing. For the poorest, money is not as important component in
their portfolio as its for the poor, so the poorest has less wealth as ination increases.
The results for distributions of wealth, earnings, consumption, after-tax income, non-
monetary assets holding, and labor hours under ination rates of 4:07% and 10% in the
benchmark model are presented as Case I in table 11 in order to facilitate comparison to
other cases.
Case II and Case III The results in Tables 7 suggest that the lump-sum transfers gen-
erated by the creation of money might be an important factor in determining the e¤ects
of ination on consumption. In the second group of experiments, Case II and Case III, we
consider an alternative setting in which only part of the seigniorage is transferred to the con-
sumers and the rest of seigniorage is invested in infrastructure. In particular, we set $ = 0:6
in Case II and $ = 0 in Case III. To facilitate comparison with the benchmark economy, we
recalibrate the value of  and A so that the long-run rate of return from physical capital is
6% and the average time spent on working is about one-third. All other parameter values
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are the same as in the benchmark model (i.e., Case I). In particular, the common growth
rate and ination rate are again equal to 2:06% and 4:07%, respectively. Since  = 0; CIA
constraint implies that individual consumption is equivalent to their real money balances.
Lump-sum transfer is still equally distributed across all consumers. Equation (24) can be
rewritten as (1 + )ci = y

i   (yi )  (   1)ai +$m. Both $ and  have direct e¤ects
on consumption. We then conduct the policy experiment for 10% ination rate to show the
distributional e¤ects of ination in both cases. The results are shown in column 4-7 of Table
11. To conserve space, we only report the Gini coe¢ cients of the individual-level variables.
When ination rate increases from 4.07% to 10%; we nd that equilibrium wage rate and
interest rate go up in both cases. Due to the higher interest rate, the lower half of distribution
now save more in terms of non-monetary assets as ination increases, while the upper half
still save less as they do in Case I. As a result, the dispersion of non-monetary assets across
groups decreases. We still observe a distortion of labor supply across groups, and the ones
towards the lower end of the distribution decrease their labor supply more as is observed
in Case I. Now both the before-tax income and after-tax income for all groups increase as
ination increases. For the lower half of the distribution, their interest income increases more
than the decrease in their earnings, while for the upper half, both their earnings and interest
income increase. Income distribution becomes more equal under higher ination. All groups
consume more and carry more real money balances. The wealth for the lower half increases,
and for the upper half decreases. The higher price harms the capital accumulation on the
aggregate level. Similar results are observed in Case III.
Case IV and Case V In Case IV we generalize the CIA constraint and assume that a
small fraction (5%) of aggregate investment is subject to the CIA constraint. The model is
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recalibrated by adjusting parameters A and : Transfer is again equally distributed across
all consumers. By comparing with Case II, the ndings are almost the same, so the pattern
in the above results are not quite a¤ected by the value of : In Case V, we change the
transfer allocation across groups. When we let the two groups at the lower end of the income
distribution get no transfer at all and the part of the seigniorage is equally distributed among
the rest eight groups, the same pattern of change is still observed as in Case II. Especially,
the change of consumption across groups. So, there is real e¤ects of ination on the change of
inequality and other aggregate variables and the numerical ndings are robust under certain
changes of the model.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous consumers is used
to study the distributional e¤ects of monetary policy. Money is introduced through a gener-
alized cash-in-advance constraint. The benchmark model is calibrated to match the wealth
and income distributions in the United States and other key features of the U.S. economy.
The e¤ects of ination on economic inequality are quantied through a series of counterfac-
tual experiments. Our results suggest that, as ination rate increases, inequality in wealth,
income (both before-tax and after-tax) and earnings also increase. But the distributions
of real money balances and consumption may actually become more equal when ination
increases.
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Table 1a Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Description Value
A Parameter in utility function 32:2
' Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2:50
 Share of capital income in total output 0:360
 Depreciation rate of capital 0:0600
{ Degree of progressivity 0:877
 Fraction of investment required cash 0
 Growth rate of nominal money supply 0:0621
10 Subjective discount factor of top income group 0:997
$ Fraction of newly printed money used as transfer 1:00
 Parameter in the progressive tax function 0:0551
% Contribution of Ht in production function 0:200
 Growth factor of technological factor 1:01
 Fraction of Gt in aggregate output 0:0520
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Table 1b Consumer Characteristics
Income Brackets (%) i "i
1  5 0:9613 0:1000
5  10 0:9614 0:1911
10  20 0:9616 0:2712
20  40 0:9620 0:4791
40  60 0:9625 0:7992
60  80 0:9633 1:264
80  90 0:9643 1:904
90  95 0:9655 2:542
95  99 0:9692 4:393
99  100 0:9973 27:50
Table 2 Benchmark Results
Model Data
Annual Growth Rate (%) 2:06 2:06
Ination Rate (%) 4:07 4:07
Ratios to GDP
Physical Capital 2:95 3:00
Private Consumption 0:683 0:630
Receipts from Personal Income Tax 0:079 0:078
Note: Data marked with an asterisk are the targeted statistics.
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Table 3 Inequality in the Benchmark Economy
Shares in Each Group of Total Sample
Gini Bottom (%) Quintiles Top (%)
Coe¤. 1  5 5  10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90  95 95  99 99  100
Earnings:
Model 0:555 0:26 0:70 2:99 7:44 12:65 20:07 56:85 9:90 13:19 18:62
Data 0:636 0:10 0:20 1:30 5:70 11:40 20:30 61:30 11:30 16:60 17:40
Income:
Model 0:560 0:33 0:63 2:89 6:74 11:26 18:31 60:81 10:13 15:81 20:95
Data 0:575 0:30 0:60 2:80 6:70 11:30 18:30 60:90 10:20 15:90 21:00
Wealth:
Model 0:670 0:60 0:48 2:84 5:06 7:68 13:71 70:70 10:85 23:06 26:17
Data 0:816 0:60 0:50 3:70 5:00 7:60 13:60 70:10 10:80 22:90 25:90
Data Source: Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011), Table 5.
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Table 4 Importance of Money Holdings
Income Brackets (%) Share of Wealth held as Money (%)
1  5 17:80
5  10 47:87
10  20 28:00
20  40 31:18
40  60 32:41
60  80 28:10
80  90 26:71
90  95 17:98
95  99 11:98
99  100 9:70
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Table 5 Wealth by Groups
Model Experiments
 = 6:21% 4:10% 7:16% 12:27%
Income Brackets (%)  = 1:0407 1:02 1:05 1:10
1  5 0:2430 0:2452 0:2415 0:2301
5  10 0:1576 0:1546 0:1585 0:1592
10  20 0:2880 0:2860 0:2886 0:2892
20  40 0:4131 0:4121 0:4135 0:4144
40  60 0:6261 0:6282 0:6253 0:6216
60  80 1:118 1:125 1:115 1:101
80  90 1:731 1:745 1:725 1:698
90  95 3:541 3:563 3:532 3:487
95  99 9:406 9:445 9:389 9:304
99  100 42:69 42:84 42:63 42:30
Gini Coe¤. 0:6701 0:6707 0:6699 0:6689
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Table 6 Earnings by Groups
Benchmark Experiments
Income Brackets (%)  = 1:0407 1:02 1:05 1:10
1  5 0:0185 0:0194 0:0182 0:0166
5  10 0:0403 0:0416 0:0397 0:0372
10  20 0:0582 0:0596 0:0576 0:0549
20  40 0:1069 0:1083 0:1062 0:1031
40  60 0:1817 0:1832 0:1811 0:1778
60  80 0:2883 0:2897 0:2878 0:2847
80  90 0:4352 0:4364 0:4347 0:4319
90  95 0:5687 0:5696 0:5683 0:5660
95  99 0:9472 0:9476 0:9470 0:9460
99  100 5:349 5:345 5:351 5:360
Gini Coe¤. 0:5216 0:5190 0:5228 0:5283
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Table 7 Consumption by Groups
Benchmark Experiments
Income Brackets (%)  = 1:0407 1:02 1:05 1:10
1  5 0:0433 0:0390 0:0451 0:0546
5  10 0:0597 0:0560 0:0613 0:0697
10  20 0:0807 0:0774 0:0821 0:0893
20  40 0:1288 0:1266 0:1297 0:1346
40  60 0:2030 0:2023 0:2032 0:2047
60  80 0:3141 0:3157 0:3134 0:3099
80  90 0:4625 0:4670 0:4605 0:4503
90  95 0:6366 0:6446 0:6331 0:6153
95  99 1:127 1:145 1:119 1:080
99  100 4:140 4:216 4:106 3:935
Gini Coe¤. 0:4770 0:4844 0:4737 0:4569
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Table 8 After-tax Income by Groups
Benchmark Experiments
Income Brackets (%)  = 1:0407 1:02 1:05 1:10
1  5 0:0308 0:0321 0:0303 0:0274
5  10 0:0462 0:0475 0:0456 0:0426
10  20 0:0707 0:0721 0:0701 0:0669
20  40 0:1234 0:1249 0:1227 0:1194
40  60 0:2051 0:2066 0:2044 0:2009
60  80 0:3310 0:3326 0:3303 0:3267
80  90 0:4981 0:4997 0:4974 0:4937
90  95 0:7168 0:7184 0:7160 0:7124
95  99 1:348 1:350 1:348 1:344
99  100 5:172 5:172 5:171 5:171
Gini Ceo¤. 0:5218 0:5195 0:5228 0:5279
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Table 9 Non-monetary Assets Holding by Groups
Benchmark Experiments
Income Brackets (%)  = 1:0407 1:02 1:05 1:10
1  5 0:1997 0:2061 0:1964 0:1755
5  10 0:0980 0:0986 0:0972 0:0895
10  20 0:2074 0:2086 0:2066 0:1999
20  40 0:2843 0:2855 0:2837 0:2798
40  60 0:4232 0:4259 0:4221 0:4169
60  80 0:8039 0:8096 0:8016 0:7910
80  90 1:269 1:278 1:265 1:248
90  95 2:905 2:918 2:899 2:872
95  99 8:279 8:300 8:269 8:224
99  100 38:55 38:63 38:52 38:36
Gini Coe¤. 0:7088 0:7083 0:7090 0:7106
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Table 10 Individual Labor Supply by Groups
Benchmark Experiments
Income Brackets (%)  = 1:0407 1:02 1:05 1:10
1  5 0:2824 0:2965 0:2768 0:2520
5  10 0:3215 0:3324 0:3170 0:2959
10  20 0:3274 0:3354 0:3241 0:3078
20  40 0:3402 0:3451 0:3380 0:3272
40  60 0:3467 0:3498 0:3453 0:3384
60  80 0:3478 0:3498 0:3470 0:3425
80  90 0:3486 0:3498 0:3480 0:3450
90  95 0:3412 0:3421 0:3408 0:3387
95  99 0:3288 0:3292 0:3286 0:3275
99  100 0:2966 0:2967 0:2966 0:2964
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Table 11 Sensitivity Analysis
Case I Case II Case III
(Benchmark)
Parameters  = 0; i= 1;  = 0; i= 1;  = 0; i= 1;
$ = 1 $ = 0:6 $ = 0
Ination Rate 4:07% 10% 4:07% 10% 4:07% 10%
Wage Rate 0:6558 0:6575 0:8306 0:9204 1:0603 1:2468
Interest Rate 0:0620 0:06197 0:0610 0:0613 0:0605 0:0609
K/Y Ratio 2:9508 2:9515 2:9742 2:9680 2:9873 2:9765
Gini Coe¢ cients
Wealth 0:6701 0:6689 0:6701 0:4968 0:6701 0:3979
Earnings 0:5216 0:5283 0:5231 0:5370 0:5248 0:5415
Consumption 0:4770 0:4569 0:4895 0:4474 0:5079 0:4589
After-tax
Income 0:5218 0:5279 0:5222 0:4745 0:5224 0:4434
Non-monetary
Assets 0:7088 0:7106 0:7054 0:5002 0:7011 0:3790
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Table 11 Sensitivity Analysis (contd)
Case IV Case V
Parameters  = 0:05; i= 1;  = 0; 1= 0;
$ = 0:6 2= 0; $ = 0:6
Ination Rate 4:07% 10% 4:07% 10%
Wage Rate 0:8304 0:9197 0:8778 0:9726
Interest Rate 0:0612 0:0617 0:0605 0:0607
K/Y Ratio 2:9696 2:9586 2:9877 2:9815
Gini Coe¢ cients
Wealth 0:6701 0:4976 0:6701 0:4940
Earnings 0:5230 0:5369 0:5235 0:5373
Consumption 0:4894 0:4473 0:4929 0:4536
After-tax
Income 0:5222 0:4747 0:5224 0:4745
Non-monetary
Assets 0:7055 0:5012 0:7057 0:4977
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Derivation of Euler Equation
Using (74) and (75), we can get
 i;t + i;t = ( i;t + i;t) + (1  ) i;t
= c 1i;t + (1  )i (t+1ci;t+1) 1 :
Substituting these into (73) gives the Euler equation

ci;t
+ i

1  
t+1ci;t+1

= (i)
2

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1
t+2ci;t+2
+ i


ci;t+1
+ i

1  
t+2ci;t+2

) 
ci;t
=
i
ci;t+1

  1  
t+1

+
(i)
2
t+2ci;t+2

1   0t+1 (yi;t+1)

rt+1 + 1  
	
:
1.6.2 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
We now provide the formal derivation of the equations in (17)-(24). In any balanced-growth
equilibrium, the real money supply is growing at the common growth rate    1; so that
M
s
t+1
Pt+1
= 
M
s
t
Pt
) M
s
t+1
M
s
t
= 1 +  = 
Pt+1
Pt
:
Hence, the growth factor of the general price level in any balanced-growth equilibrium is
given by
Pt+1
Pt
=
1 + 

= : (25)
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Next, substituting ci;t  tbci ; t =  and rt = r into the Euler equation in (78) gives
 =
i


  1  


+
1


i

2
f[1  (1 + ) (byi ){] r + 1  g :
which is (17) in the text. Next, using the rst-order conditions in (79), we can get
Kt
Nt
=
wt
(1  ) (rt + ) (26)
) wt = (1  )XtH
%
1 
t


rt + 
 
1 
:
Dividing both sides by t gives
bw = (1  ) 
r + 
 
1  bh %1  ; (27)
which is (47) in the text. By the denition of yi;t; we can get
byi = "i bwli + rbai :
Aggregating across all groups of consumers gives
SX
i=1
ibyi = bw SX
i=1
i"il

i + r

SX
i=1
ibai
= bwN + rbk
=
 bwNbk + r
bk
=
1

[r + (1  ) ]bk: (28)
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The second line uses the labor market clearing condition and the capital market clearing
condition. The fourth line uses (26). Rearranging terms in the above equation gives (48).
Next, combining (43), (16) and Gt = vYt gives
Ht+1   (1  )Ht + vYt =
SP
i=1
iety1+{i;t + (1 $)
 
M
s
t+1  M
s
t
Pt
!
:
In a balanced-growth equilibrium, this becomes
( +    1)bh + v Yt
Kt
bk =  SP
i=1
i(byi )1+{ +$bm:
Substituting (r + ) = Yt=Kt into the above equation gives (46).
Combining the individual budget constraint and the CIA constraint gives
(1  ) (ai;t+1   ai;t) + t+1mi;t+1 = yi;t [1  et (yi;t){] + i$mst :
Summing across all types of consumers gives
(1  ) (Kt+1  Kt) + t+1mst+1 =
SX
i=1
iyi;t [1  et (yi;t){] +$mst :
In a balanced-growth equilibrium, this becomes
(1  ) (   1)bk + (1 +  $) bm = SX
i=1
ibyi [1  (byi ){]:
Equation (50) can be obtained by rearranging terms in the above expression.
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2 Ination and Economic Growth in a Search-
Theoretic Model of Money
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between ination and long-term economic growth is a classic question in
macroeconomics. It belongs to a more general discussion on the property of non-superneutrality
of money. Increasing anticipated ination, which due to a faster growth rate of nominal
money supply, has growth and welfare e¤ects. Empirical evidence shows that whether in-
ation is benecial or detrimental to growth depending upon the countries and episodes
considered in the study (Fischer, 1990; Barro 2013; Mallik and Chowdhury, 2001). For high
ination rates, which is often above 10 percent, its clear that the e¤ects on long-term growth
is detrimental, while for lower ination episodes, the evidence is mixed.
Its not the rst time that this question has been addressed, but when introducing money,
previous work implicitly presumes there is certain role of money, and builds frictionless model
based on that, i.e. either by putting money in the utility function or imposing cash-in-
advance constraint. Comparing with these reduced-form approaches, we use a new mone-
tarist approach which explicitly specifying money in a frictional search and matching setting
to reexamine the relationship between ination and growth. New monetarist approach can
go back at least to Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993), Shi (1995, 1999), Kocherlakota (1998)
and others. Then, new monetarist approach has been integrated in a tractable way to study
mainstream macro issues (Lagos and Wright, 2005). These applied works include Aruoba,
Waller, and Wright (2012) which examine the e¤ects of ination on investment, Aruoba and
Chugh (2010) which study the optimal scal and monetary policy, Lagos and Rocheteau
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(2008) which examine issues related to liquidity in asset markets, Williamson (2012) which
applies this framework to analyze the e¤ects of nancial crises, etc. Williamson and Wright
(2010a,b) provide more comprehensive surveys about this literature.
The other feature of this study is endogenous growth, introduced through productive
government spending (Barro 1990). The intuition for this ingredient is that an important use
of government spending is to provide infrastructures that can facilitate private production,
such as building highways, etc. With productive government spending, economy grows
perpetually in the long run, and the growth rate is endogenously determined in the model.
Our contribution is to reexamine the e¤ects of ination on this growth rate when we explicitly
consider the role of money as a medium of exchange. We emphasize the growth e¤ects of
ination through those extra benets of holding money, which are the increase in the trade
surplus in stochastic trading process and the increase in the e¢ ciency of the whole economy.
Put it in another way, without explicitly consider this aspect, ination is a tax on investment,
and economy reaches a steady state with lower capital per worker in the long run than its
in the e¢ cient case, while with explicitly consider this aspect, by holding either more money
or more capital, the consumers might become better o¤ in the stochastic trading process,
which is novel in the endogenous growth literature. The goal of this chapter is to quantify
this e¤ect.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model which
modies the model in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011) to allow for endogenous economic
growth. Section 3 describes the calibration procedure and presents the numerical results.
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2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The Environment
Time is discrete and is denoted by t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g : The economy under study is inhabited
by a continuum of ex ante identical, innitely-lived consumers. The size of population is
constant over time and is normalized by one. Each time period is divided into two subperiods.
In the rst subperiod, a single commodity is produced and traded in a decentralized market
(DM). Transactions in the DM are not monitored and occur anonymously between pairs
of randomly matched buyers and sellers. This creates a need for using money as medium
of exchange.16 In the second subperiod, a di¤erent commodity is produced and traded
in a frictionless centralized market environment (CM). This part of the model economy is
essentially identical to the standard neoclassical economy. In each period, rms hire labor
and physical capital from competitive factor markets in order to produce the CM good,
while consumers supply labor and decide how much to save and consume. Since there is no
trading friction in the CM, money is not needed in the second subperiod. The government
in this economy collects taxes from the consumers and provides a constantly growing supply
of money. It also nances and maintains infrastructure capital which is conducive to the
production of goods.
2.2.2 Centralized Markets
Consumers Problem All consumers have preferences over consumption and labor hours
in the CM in each period. Let ct and lt denote consumption and labor hours in the second
16In order to rule out the use of physical capital as medium of exchange in the DM, it is assumed that
physical capital is unportable and that claims to physical capital can be costlessly counterfeited by anyone
in the economy.
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subperiod at time t: Consumers preferences over (ct; lt) are represented by
U (ct; lt) = ln ct   Alt;
where A is a positive constant. As is well-known in the growth theory literature, if the
period utility function is additively separable in consumption and labor hours, then the
utility function of consumption must be logarithmic in order to be consistent with balanced
growth.
In each period, each consumer receives two types of taxable income, namely labor income
from work and interest income from physical capital. Let wt be the market wage rate at time
t: Then a typical consumers labor income at time t is given by wtlt: This type of income is
taxed at a constant tax rate of  l 2 (0; 1) : Let bkt be the quantity of physical capital owned
by a typical consumer at the beginning of the second subperiod, and rt be the net rate of
return from physical capital at time t: Then the amount of interest income is rtbkt; which
is taxed at a constant rate of  k 2 (0; 1) : Consumers in this economy can save by holding
physical capital and money. Let bmt denote nominal money holdings at the beginning of the
second subperiod at time t; and let pt be the general price level in the CM. The consumers
budget constraint in this subperiod is given by
(1 +  c) ct + kt+1   bkt + mt+1   bmt
pt
= (1   l)wtlt + (1   k) rtbkt + t; (29)
where  c > 0 is a constant tax rate on consumption and t is a lump-sum transfer of real
money from the government. In the above equation, kt+1 and mt+1 represent the stock of
physical capital and nominal money that the consumer brings into the DM at time t+ 1:17
17The notations (mt; kt) and
bmt;bkt are used to highlight the fact that the consumers enter the DM and
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LetWt
bm;bk be the expected lifetime utility for a consumer who enters the CM at time
t with assets
bm;bk ; and let Vt (m; k) be the expected lifetime utility for a consumer who
enters the DM at time t with assets (m; k) : All consumers use the same subjective discount
factor  2 (0; 1) to discount utilities from future time periods, but there is no discounting
between the DM and CM of the same time period. Given a set of government policies
f c;  l;  k; tg and a set of prices fwt; rt; ptg ; the consumers problem in the CM is to choose
an allocation fct; lt; kt+1;mt+1g so as to maximize his expected lifetime utility. Formally, this
is given by
Wt
bmt;bkt = max
ct;lt;kt+1;mt+1
fln ct   Alt + Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1)g (30)
subject to the sequential budget constraint in (68). After substituting lt in (69) with the
budget constraint, we can obtain
Wt
bmt;bkt = 
t bmt;bkt+ max
ct;mt+1;kt+1

ln ct   A
(1   l)wt

(1 +  c) ct + kt+1 +
mt+1
pt

+ Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1)

;
(31)
where

t
bmt;bkt  A
(1   l)wt

[1 + (1   k) rt]bkt + bmt
pt
+ t

:
The expression in (70) makes clear that the optimal choices of (ct;mt+1; kt+1) are independent
of
bmt;bkt : This is due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function U (ct; lt) : If Vt+1 () is
strictly concave, then the consumers problem has a unique solution in (mt+1; kt+1) and this
implies that all consumers will enter the DM at time t+ 1 with the same amount of assets.
Formally, let Ft+1 (m; k) be the cross-sectional distribution of assets at the beginning of the
DM at time t + 1: Then this distribution is degenerate if Vt+1 () is strictly concave.18 We
the CM of the same time period with di¤erent amount of assets.
18Since the consumers are assumed to be ex ante identical, they all have the same amount of initial assets at
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will formally establish the strict concavity of Vt+1 () in the next subsection.
The rst-order conditions with respect to ct; mt+1 and kt+1 are given by
1
(1 +  c) ct
=
A
(1   l)wt ; (32)
A
(1   l) ptwt = 
@Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@mt+1
; (33)
A
(1   l)wt = 
@Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@kt+1
: (34)
The expression in (70) also makes clear that Wt
bmt;bkt is linear in bmt;bkt with partial
derivatives
Wm;t 
@Wt
bmt;bkt
@ bmt = A(1   l) ptwt ; (35)
W k;t 
@Wt
bmt;bkt
@bkt = [1 + (1   k) rt]A(1   l)wt : (36)
Production of CM Goods On the supply side of the centralized environment, there is a
large number of identical rms which produce the CM good. The production technology is
given by
Yt = bK%t (HtLt)1 % ; with % 2 (0; 1) ;
where Yt denotes output produced at time t; bKt is capital input, Lt is labor input and Ht
is the stock of infrastructure capital available at the beginning of time t: The value of Ht
is taken as exogenously given by individual rms. Since the production function exhibits
constant returns to scale in the private inputs (i.e., bKt and Lt), we can focus on the choices
the beginning of the rst subperiod at time 0: In other words, the initial distribution F0 (m; k) is degenerate
by assumption.
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made by a single, price-taking rm. Let Rt be the rental price of physical capital at time t:
Then the representative rm solves the following problem
maxbKt;Lt
n bK%t (HtLt)1 %   wtLt  Rt bKto ;
and the rst-order conditions are given by
wt = (1  %) bK%t L %t H1 %t ; and Rt = % bK% 1t (HtLt)1 % :
Let  2 (0; 1) be the depreciation rate of physical capital in the second subperiod. Then the
rate of return rt is determined by rt = Rt   :
2.2.3 Decentralized Market
Similar to Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011), we assume that consumers face idiosyncractic
uncertainty regarding their identity in the DM. Specically, with equal probability  2
(0; 1=2) ; a consumer is either a buyer or a seller in the DM. In the current model, a buyer is
someone who has access to an investment opportunity which converts one unit of DM good
into z > 0 units of physical capital within the same subperiod. A buyer, however, does not
possess the knowledge or technology to produce the DM goods. Thus, he has to purchase
these goods from the decentralized market. A seller, on the other hand, is someone who can
produce the DM goods but does not have access to the investment opportunity. Hence, the
sole purpose of producing the DM goods is to sell them for prot. The equal probability
assumption ensures that there is an equal number of buyers and sellers in the DM. Finally,
with probability 1  2; a consumer is neither a buyer nor a seller, which means he does not
have access to the investment opportunity nor the technology for producing the DM goods.
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These consumers will be referred to as non-participants in the DM.
The sequence of events in the DM is as follows: At the beginning of the rst subperiod,
all consumers are randomly assigned to one of the following three groups: buyers, sellers
and non-participants. The random identity is drawn independently across consumers and
across time. A matching technology then assigns each buyer to exactly one seller. Each pair
of trading partners will then determine the terms of trade through bargaining. Once the
transaction is completed, the buyer will transform the purchased DM goods into physical
capital.
Production of DM Goods First, consider a consumer who has been assigned as a seller
in the DM at time t. The quantity of DM goods that can be produced is determined by
three factors: (i) the sellers own capital kt; (ii) the rate of utilization of the capital stock,
denoted by st 2 [0; 1] ; and (iii) the existing stock of infrastructure capital Ht; which is taken
as exogenously given by the consumers. Formally, the technology for producing the DM
good is given by
xt = (stkt)
H1 t ; with  2 (0; 1) ;
where xt is the quantity of DM goods produced. The variable st captures the intensity with
which the sellers own capital is used in the production process. In particular, a higher value
of st means that it is being used more intensively, which will result in a faster depreciation
rate during the rst subperiod. Formally, the depreciation rate in the rst subperiod is
endogenously determined by
e (st) = st ; with  2 (0; 1) and  > 1:
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Since st is bounded above by one, this means for any given (kt; Ht) 2 R2++ there is a limit
on how much a seller can produce at time t: This limit is denoted by xt  ktH1 t : For any
xt 2 [0; xt] ; the depreciation rate of physical capital in the rst subperiod can be rewritten
as
e (xt; kt;Ht)  
24 xtH 1t  1
kt
35 : (37)
The restrictions  > 1 >  imply that e (xt; kt;Ht) is strictly convex in xt for any (kt; Ht) 2
R2++:
Bargaining Process Consider a random encounter in the DM that involves a buyer with
assets
 
mbt ; k
b
t

and a seller with assets (mst ; k
s
t ) : Let dt denote the payment (in units of
money) for xt units of DM goods. By acquiring this amount of DM goods, the buyer can
generate zxt units of physical capital which he can bring forward to the second subperiod.
Thus, the buyers gain from trade is
Wt
 
mbt   dt; kbt + zxt
 Wt  mbt ; kbt
=
A
(1   l)wt

[1 + (1   k) rt] zxt   dt
pt

:
The second line follows from (74) and (75). As for the seller, after producing xt units of
DM goods, a fraction e (xt; kst ;Ht) of his capital will be lost through depreciation. This is
compensated by a gain of dt units of money. The sellers gain from trade is thus
Wt

mst + dt;

1  e (xt; kst ;Ht) kst Wt (mst ; kst )
=
A
(1   l)wt

dt
pt
  [1 + (1   k) rt]e (xt; kst ;Ht) kst :
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Summing these two expressions gives the total trade surplus,
A
(1   l)wt [1 + (1   k) rt]
h
zxt   e (xt; kst ;Ht) kst i :
Since e (xt; kt;Ht) is strictly convex in xt; there exists a unique value bxt > 0 that maximizes
the total trade surplus for any given (kst ; Ht) 2 R2++ (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Total Trade Surplus in the DM.
In the current study, we contemplate a bargaining process in which the total trade sur-
plus is divided proportionally between the buyer and the seller. Kalai (1977) provides an
axiomatic foundation for this type of bargaining outcome.19 In the monetary search liter-
19In particular, Kalai (1977) shows that the solution of a n-person bargaining game is proportional if and
only if it satises the axiom of monotonicity. In words, this axiom requires that no player will be made worse
o¤ when additional options are made available to them.
51
ature, proportional bargaining solution has also been considered in Aruoba et al. (2007),
Craig and Rocheteau (2008) and Waller (2011). Under this type of bargaining process, the
buyers gain from trade is proportional to the sellers gain from trade, so that
[1 + (1   k) rt] zxt   dt
pt
=

1  

dt
pt
  [1 + (1   k) rt]e (xt; kst ;Ht) kst ; (38)
where  2 (0; 1) is an exogenous parameter that indicates the share of total trade surplus
received by the buyer. Given the sharing rule in (78), the values of dt and xt are chosen
so as to maximize the total trade surplus, subject to the buyers cash constraint and the
sellers production capacity constraint. Formally, the bargaining solution can be obtained
by solving
max
dt;xt
h
zxt   e (xt; kst ;Ht) kst i (P1)
subject to (78), dt  mbt and xt 2 [0; xt] : To simplify the analysis, we focus on equilibria
in which bxt > xt for all t  0: 20 In this type of equilibria, total trade surplus is always
maximized at xt = xt: But the actual quantity of DM goods being traded may be di¤erent
from xt as it depends on the quantity of money held by the buyer. Formally, after substituting
xt = xt and e (xt; kst ;Ht) =  into (78), we can obtain
dt  pt [1 + (1   k) rt]

(1  ) z (kst )H1 t + kst

; (39)
20This condition holds if and only if
z > ex (xt; kst ;Ht) kst = 

kst
Ht
1 
for all t  0: In the following analysis, we will rst characterize the long-run balanced-growth equilibria
under this assumption, and then check that it is satised in these equilibria.
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which is the required payment for xt units of DM goods under proportional bargaining. If the
buyer has enough money to make this payment, i.e., mbt  dt; then the bargaining outcome is 
dt; xt

: Note that both dt and xt are independent of mbt : If the buyer does not have enough
cash for xt units of DM goods, then the quantity being traded is uniquely and endogenously
determined by
mbt
pt
= [1 + (1   k) rt]
h
(1  ) zxt + e (xt; kst ;Ht) kst i : (40)
Equation (40) implicitly denes a strictly increasing function xt = t
 
mbt ; k
s
t

; which indi-
cates the volume of trade in this case. By comparing (39) to (40), it is obvious to see that
xt = t
 
dt; k
s
t

: The partial derivatives of t
 
mbt ; k
s
t

are given by
@t
 
mbt ; k
s
t

@mbt
=
1
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
h
(1  ) z + ex (xt; kst ;Ht) kst i > 0;
@t
 
mbt ; k
s
t

@kst
=
 (   1)e (xt; kst ;Ht)
(1  ) z + ex (xt; kst ;Ht) kst > 0: (41)
Holding other things constant, an increase in the amount of money held by the buyer (say
from mbt to m
b
t + "; with " > 0 and m
b
t + " < dt) will relax the buyers cash constraint and
allow more goods to be traded. Hence, t
 
mbt ; k
s
t

is strictly increasing in mbt : On the other
hand, an increase in kst means that more DM goods can be produced by the seller. Hence,
t
 
mbt ; k
s
t

is also strictly increasing in kst :
The outcome of this bilateral trading process can be summarized by a pair of functions,
Dt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

and Xt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

; which specify the payment and the quantity of goods being
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traded, respectively. These functions are given by Dt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

= min

dt;m
b
t
	
and
Xt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

=
8><>: (k
s
t )
H1 t if m
b
t  dt;
t
 
mbt ; k
s
t

if mbt < dt:
The relationship between Dt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

and Xt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

is depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Relationship between Dt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

and Xt
 
mbt ; k
s
t

:
Expected Value in the DM We now characterize the value function Vt (mt; kt) ; which
indicates the expected value of consumer in the DM at time t before the random identity
is revealed. The main result of this subsection is Proposition 3 which establishes the strict
concavity of Vt () :
Suppose a consumer with assets (mt; kt) has been assigned as a buyer in the DM. Then
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his expected lifetime utility is given by
V bt (mt; kt) =
Z
Wt

mt  Dt

mt;ekt ; kt + zXt mt;ekt dFt emt;ekt :
In the above expression, ekt denotes the quantity of physical capital owned by a potential
trading partner (a seller). This quantity is randomly drawn according to the distribution
Ft
emt;ekt : If the same consumer has been assigned as a seller in the DM, then his expected
lifetime utility is
V st (mt; kt) =
Z
Wt (mt +Dt (emt; kt) ; kt   t (emt; kt)) dFt emt;ekt ;
where t (emt; kt)  e (Xt (emt; kt) ; kt;Ht) kt; and emt is the quantity of money held by a
potential trading partner (a buyer). If the consumer is a non-participant in the DM, then
his expected value is simply Wt (mt; kt) : Thus, before his identity in the DM is revealed, we
have
Vt (mt; kt) = V
b
t (mt; kt) + V
s
t (mt; kt) + (1  2)Wt (mt; kt) : (42)
Proposition 3 provides a su¢ cient condition under which Vt () is strictly concave in (mt; kt)
for all t  0: The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose "   (2  ) : Then the value function Vt (mt; kt) dened in (42)
is strictly concave in (mt; kt) for all t  0:
From this point onward, we will assume that the condition in Proposition 3 is satised
so that all the consumers will carry the same amount of assets when they enter the DM
in every period. In terms of notations, this means there is no need to distinguish between
(mt; kt) and
emt;ekt : This also means that all the bilateral trade in the DM will lead to the
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same outcome.
Implications for the CM Using the decentralized trading outcome described above, we
can now provide a sharper prediction for the consumers choices in the CM. In the CM at
time t; all consumers have to decide on the value of (mt+1; kt+1), taking into account the
bilateral trading outcome in the DM at time t+1: The main consideration here is whether it is
optimal for the consumer to carry an excess amount of money into the DM, i.e., mt+1 > dt+1:
Since all the sellers in the DM can at most produce xt+1 units of DM goods (and sell at a
price of dt+1), carrying an excess amount of money will have no e¤ect on the bargaining
outcome. Thus, conditional on mt+1 > dt+1; the marginal benet of increasing mt+1 is given
by
@Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@mt+1
= Wm;t+1 =
A
(1   l) pt+1wt+1 ;
which comes from the store-of-value function of money. Substituting this into (73) gives the
condition under which mt+1 > dt+1 is optimal,
A
(1   l) ptwt = 
A
(1   l) pt+1wt+1 ,
pt+1wt+1
ptwt
=  < 1:
Thus, it is optimal to have mt+1 > dt+1 only when the nominal wage is decreasing at a rate
of (1  ) between time t and t+ 1: If instead we have pt+1wt+1 > ptwt; then the marginal
benet of reducing mt+1 will outweigh its marginal cost of doing so, i.e.,
A
(1   l) ptwt > 
A
(1   l) pt+1wt+1 ;
so that it is not optimal to have mt+1 > dt+1: This result is summarized in the following
lemma.
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Lemma 2 Suppose pt+1wt+1 > ptwt; for some t  0: Then the optimal choice of mt+1 in
the CM at time t must be bounded above by dt+1; i.e., mt+1  dt+1:
Suppose now the consumer chooses to have mt+1 < dt+1: In this case, any small change in
mt+1 would a¤ect the outcome in the DM at time t+ 1: In particular, the partial derivative
of Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1) with respect to mt+1 is now given by
@Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@mt+1
=
A
(1   l) pt+1wt+1

1 + 

pt+1t+1z
@t+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@mt+1
  1

; (43)
where t+1  [1 + (1   k) rt+1] : Equation (43) summarizes the marginal benets of carrying
more money into period t + 1: These benets are twofold. The rst type of benet comes
from the store-of-value function of money. Specically, an increase in mt+1 means that
the consumer will enter the CM at time t + 1 with more assets, which raises the value of
Wt+1
bmt+1;bkt+1. The marginal gain in Wt+1 () is A= [(1   l) pt+1wt+1] : The second type
of benet comes from the medium-of-exchange function of money. In particular, an increase
in mt+1 relaxes the buyers cash constraint in the DM and promotes trade. The marginal
gain in lifetime utility is given by
A
(1   l) pt+1wt+1

pt+1t+1z
@t+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@mt+1
  1

:
Note that the second type of benet arises only when the consumer appears as a buyer in
the DM, which happens with probability . Equation (73) states that the optimal quantity
of mt+1 is determined by equating the discounted marginal benets of holding more money
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to its marginal cost. Substituting (43) into (73) gives
ct+1
ct
=
wt+1
wt
=
pt
pt+1

1 + 

pt+1t+1z
@t+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@mt+1
  1

: (44)
Next, we turn to the marginal benets of holding more capital in period t + 1: These
benets are given by
@Vt+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@kt+1
=
t+1A
(1   l)wt+1

1  @t+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@kt+1

:
Holding other things constant, an increase in kt+1 not only yields a gross after-tax re-
turn t+1; it also allows the consumer to produce more DM goods if he appears as a
seller in the DM at time t + 1: The second type of benet is captured by the expression
 @t+1 (mt+1; kt+1) =@kt+1; which is strictly positive. Substituting the above expression
into (71) gives
ct+1
ct
=
wt+1
wt
= t+1

1  @t+1 (mt+1; kt+1)
@kt+1

: (45)
2.2.4 Government
The government in this economy implements both scal and monetary policies. In terms
of monetary policies, the nominal supply of money (Mt) is assumed to grow at a deter-
ministic constant rate  > 0 in every period, so that Mt+1 = (1 + )Mt; for all t  0:
The seigniorage is distributed evenly to the consumers through the lump-sum transfer, so
that ptt = Mt+1  Mt = Mt: In terms of scal policies, all the tax revenues are spent
on infrastructure investment (It) and unproductive government spending (Gt) : The latter
is assumed to consume a fraction v 2 (0; 1) of aggregate output in every period, so that
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Gt = vYt for all t: The governments budget constraint at time t is given by
 cct +  lwtlt +  krtbkt = It +Gt; (46)
The accumulation of infrastructure capital is governed by
Ht+1 = It + (1  h)Ht; (47)
where h 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of infrastructure capital and H0 > 0 is given.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the factor markets in the CM clear in every period, so that bKt = bkt and
Lt = lt for all t  0: All the nominal money issued by the government is held by the
consumers, so that Mt = mt for all t  0: The goods-market-clearing condition in the CM
and the equilibrium dynamics of physical capital can be derived as follows: Let Kt denote
the quantity of per-capita capital that is available in the DM at time t: The initial value
K0 > 0 is exogenously given. In equilibrium, all consumers enter the DM at time t  0 with
the same amount of assets (Mt; Kt) : Those who have been assigned as a seller will enter
the ensuing CM with physical capital [Kt   t (Mt; Kt)] : Those who have been assigned as
a buyer will enter the CM with physical capital [Kt + zXt (Mt; Kt)] : Finally, those who are
inactive in the DM will enter the CM at time t with Kt: Thus, the quantity of physical
capital available in the CM at time t is
bKt = Kt +  [zXt (Mt; Kt)  t (Mt; Kt)] : (48)
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Using the consumers budget constraint in (68), the governments budget constraint in (46)
and the other market clearing conditions, we can obtain the goods-market-clearing condition
in the CM, which is given by
ct +Kt+1   (1  ) bKt + It = (1  v) bK%t (HtLt)1 % : (49)
Equations (48) and (49) together describe the equilibrium dynamics of bKt and Kt:
Given a set of policy instruments f c;  l;  k; g and a set of initial conditions fM0; K0; H0g ;
an equilibrium of this economy consists of sequences of allocations
n
ct; lt; kt;mt;bkt; bmtst; xt; dto1
t=0
;
aggregate inputs
n
Kt; bKt; Lto1
t=0
; scal and monetary policy variables fMt+1; Ht+1; Gt; tg1t=0 ;
and prices fpt; wt; rt; Rtg1t=0 such that
(i) Given prices and government policies,
n
ct; lt; kt;mt;bkt; bmtst; xt; dto1
t=0
solves the con-
sumers problem in the DM and CM in every period.
(ii) Given prices and the sequence of infrastructure capital,
n bKt; Lto1
t=0
solves the repre-
sentative rms problem in the CM in every period.
(iii) The sequences
n
Kt; bKto1
t=0
satisfy (48) in every period.
(iv) The governments budget is balanced in every period, so that (46) holds for all t  0:
The stock of infrastructure capital accumulates according to (47). Nominal money
supply is determined by Mt+1 = (1 + )Mt and Gt = vYt for all t  0:
(v) All markets clear in every period.
In the following analysis, we conne our attention to balanced-growth equilibria in which
all variables are growing at some positive constant rates. Specically, we focus on equilibria
which satisfy the following additional conditions:
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(vi) The rental price of physical capital and the supply of labor in the CM are both constant
over time, i.e., Rt = R and lt = l for all t  0:
(vii) The rate of capital utilization in the DM is constant over time, i.e., st = s for all
t  0:
(viii) All other real variables, including
n
ct; Kt; bKt; Ht; xt; wt; to ; are growing at the same
constant rate. The common growth rate  is non-negative.
(ix) All nominal variables are growing at the same rate as the nominal money supply and
the growth rate is non-negative, i.e.,   0:
Since   0; it follows from Lemma 2 that it is never optimal for the consumers to
have mt+1 > dt+1: Thus, the bilateral trading outcome in the DM is given by Xt (Mt; Kt) =
t (Mt; Kt) and Dt (Mt; Kt) =Mt for all t:
Dene the transformed variables t  Kt=Ht and bt  bKt=Ht: In any balanced growth
equilibrium, both variables are constant over time, so that t =  and bt = b: The set of
stationary values f; R; s; ;bg is determined by the following system of equations:
(s)  ()1  =
z



1 +    (1  )   (1  )

 z
 () ; (50)
1 +  =  [1 + (1   k) (R   )]

1 + (1  ) (   1)

1 +    (1  )


 (s)

; (51)
 cB
 %
R
 %
1 %
+
e R
%

   k
b =  + h; (52)
b =  + [1  
 ()]z (s) ; (53)
B
 %
R
 %
1 %
+  (1 + ) +  + h =

(1  v)

R
%

+ 1  
b; (54)
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where B and e are dened as
B  (1   l) (1  %)
(1 +  c)A
and e   l (1  %) +  k%  v:
A formal derivation of these equations can be found in the Appendix. Once the values of
f; R; s; ;bg are determined, all other variables in the balanced-growth equilibrium can
be uniquely determined.
Next, we provide the expression of some great ratioswhich are of interest in the numeri-
cal analysis. In each period t; aggregate output (Y t) is dened as the sum of output produced
in the CM and the DM, i.e., Y t  bK%t (HtLt)1 % + z (stKt)H1 t : In any balanced-growth
equilibrium, the ratio between bKt and aggregate output is given by
bKt
Y t
=
b
(b)% (L)1 % + z (s) : (55)
Aggregate investment, on the other hand, is given by I t  z (stKt)H1 t +Kt+1 (1  ) bKt:
Using this, we can derive an expression for the investment-capital ratio in any balanced-
growth equilibrium, which is
I tbKt = z (s
) + (1 + ) b   (1  ) : (56)
The velocity of money in any period t is dened as V t = ptY t=Mt: Since dt = mt = Mt in
the DM, we can compute the value of V t based on Y t and (40).
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2.3 Quantitative Analysis
We now explore the quantitative implications of the above model. Our goal is to quantify
the e¤ects of ination on long-term economic growth. To achieve this, we rst construct a
benchmark model which is parameterized to match certain key features of the U.S. economy
over the period 1960-2010. We then construct a series of policy experiments to gauge to the
e¤ects of ination on economic growth. The benchmark parameter values are summarized
in Table 1. Most of these values are chosen based on empirical evidence. Others are chosen
to match certain real-world statistics. The details of this procedure are explained below.
2.3.1 Calibration
One period in the model is one year. The parameter % in the production function of the CM
good is chosen to match the share of labor income in US GDP, which is 0.60 over the period
1960-2010.21 The required value is % = 0:40: We use the same value for  so that physical
capital has the same importance in the production of the CM good and the DM good. The
tax rate on labor income and interest income are chosen based on the time series of marginal
income tax rate reported in Barro and Redlick (2011, Table 1). In particular, they report
data on both the federal and state income tax rates over the period 1912-2006. We take
the sum of the two and compute the average value over the period 1960-2006. The resulting
value is 27.6%. Hence, we set  l =  k = 0:276: The tax rate on private consumption
expenditures ( c) is set to 4.6%, which is based on the data from the National Income
21This value is computed using data on compensation of employees and proprietors income over the period
1960-2010. We assume that the share of labor income in proprietors income is identical to that of the entire
economy, so that
Labors share of income =
Compensation of Employees
GDP - Proprietors income
:
See Gomme and Rupert (2007, Section 4.2) for more details on this. Cooley and Prescott (1995) use a
di¤erent approach to compute this share, but they also obtain a value of 0.60.
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and Product Accounts.22 We set v = 0:16; which matches the percentage of government
consumption expenditures in US GDP over the period 1960-2010. The depreciation rate of
infrastructure capital (h) is chosen to match the ratio between government gross investment
and government xed assets over the same time period. The implied value is h = 0:067:We
set  = 0:5 so that the population in the model economy is equally divided into buyers and
sellers in the DM in each period. The value of  is normalized to one.
Seven parameters remain undetermined up to this point. These include the subjective
discount factor () ; a preference parameter (A) ; the depreciation rate of physical capital in
the CM () ; the growth rate of nominal money supply () ; the share of total trade surplus
claimed by the buyer () ; and two parameters related to the activities in the DM (z and
): These parameters are chosen so that the benchmark balanced-growth equilibrium has
the following properties: First, the time spent on working is one-third. Second, the common
growth rate for real variables is 2%, which matches the average annual growth rate of real
per-capita GDP in the United States over the period 1960-2010. Third, the capital-output
ratio as dened in (55) is 3.0. Fourth, the ination rate in the long-run equilibrium is 4.1%,
which is the average annual growth rate of the Consumer Price Index over this time period.
Fifth, the rate of return from physical capital in the CM is 5%. Sixth, the ratio between
investment and physical capital as dened in (56) is 8.2%. Finally, the velocity of money is
5.381. The same target is also used in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011).
22Specically, we rst obtain annual data on total sales taxes collected by state and local governments over
the period 1960-2010. We then compute the ratio between these tax revenues and total private consumption
expenditures for each year. This ratio is used as proxies for the consumption tax rate in these years. The
average value over the sample period is 4.6%.
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2.3.2 Results
Table 2 summarizes the main properties of the benchmark equilibrium and compares them
to their empirical counterparts. Besides the seven targeted statistics, the model is also
able to generate reasonable values for the share of consumption in aggregate output. In
our benchmark model, about 86% of trade surplus in the DM is claimed by the buyers.
In Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011), trade surplus is divided through generalized Nash
bargaining. In their parameterization, the bargaining power for the buyer is 92%. Another
thing worth mentioning is that, in their model the decentralized market only accounts for
about 3% of total output. In our benchmark model, the decentralized market accounts for
about 30% of total output.
Finally, we conduct a couple of counterfactual experiments by increasing the value of :
All other parameters are xed as in the benchmark scenario. In the rst experiment, we set
 = 0:0863 which gives a long-run ination rate of 6.5%. In the second experiment, we set
 = 0:1222 which generates a long-run ination rate of 10%. The results are summarized
in Table 3. In general, our results show that an increase in ination is accompanied by
an increase in the long-term growth rate but the magnitude of the e¤ect is very small. It
is also accompanied by an increase in working hours in the CM and an increase in capital
accumulation (as indicated by the capital-output ratio).
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Table 1 Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Description Value
 Subjective discount factor 0.9820
A Preference parameter 1.5696
% Parameter in CM production 0.4000
 Depreciation rate of capital in the CM 0.0446
 l Tax rate on labor income 0.2760
 k Tax rate on interest income 0.2760
 c Tax rate on consumption expenditures 0.0460
 Growth rate of nominal money supply 0.0618
v Share of unproductive government spending 0.1600
h Depreciation rate of infrastructure 0.0670
 Probability of being a buyer in the DM 0.5000
 Share of total surplus claimed by buyers 0.8595
 Parameter in the DM 1.7124
 Parameter in the DM 1.0000
 Parameter in DM production 0.4000
z Parameter in the DM 0.9164
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Table 2 Properties of Benchmark Model
Data/Target Model
Labor hours (L) 0.330 0.3299
Long-term growth rate () 0.020 0.0200
Ination rate () 0.041 0.0410
Real interest rate (r) 0.050 0.0500
Utilization rate of capital in DM (s)  0.1550
Output in the CM  0.8626
Output in the DM  0.3530
Velocity of money 5.385 5.3834
Capital-output ratio 3.000 2.9996
Consumption-output ratio 0.630 0.5690
Investment-Capital ratio 0.082 0.0820
Note: Figures marked with an asterisk are the targeted statistics.
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Table 3 Policy Experiments
Benchmark Experiments
 = 0:0618  = 0:0863  = 0:1222
Labor hours (L) 0.3299 0.3304 0.3313
Long-term growth rate () 0.0200 0.0201 0.0202
Ination rate () 0.0410 0.0650 0.1000
Real interest rate (r) 0.0500 0.0502 0.0504
Utilization rate of capital in DM (s) 0.1550 0.1492 0.1415
Output in the CM 0.8626 0.8629 0.8636
Output in the DM 0.3531 0.3476 0.3400
Velocity of money 5.3834 5.5950 5.9004
Capital-output ratio 2.9996 3.0084 3.0196
Consumption-output ratio 0.5690 0.5708 0.5730
Investment-Capital ratio 0.0820 0.0808 0.0794
68
2.4 Appendix
2.4.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Since Wt (mt; kt) is separable in its argument and linear in both kt and mt; it su¢ ce to show
that V bt (mt; kt) and V
s
t (mt; kt) are jointly strictly concave in (mt; kt) : Consider a buyer in
the DM at time t with assets (mt; kt) : Depending on whom he trade with, there are two
possible bargaining outcomes: (i) mt  dt and (ii) mt < dt; where
dt  pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
h
(1  ) z
ektH1 t + ekti :
If mt  dt, then the buyers payo¤ is
Wt

mt   dt; kt + z
ektH1 t  = Wt (mt; kt) Wm;tdt +W k;tz ektH1 t ;
which is a linear function in mt and kt: If mt < dt; then the buyers payo¤ is
Wt

0; kt + zt

mt;ekt = Wt (mt; kt) Wm;tmt +W k;tzt mt;ekt ; (57)
which is linear in kt: This payo¤ function is strictly concave in mt if and only if t

mt;ekt
is strictly concave in mt: As shown in the main text, we have
@t

mt;ekt
@mt
=
1
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
h
(1  ) z + ex xt;ekt;Htekti > 0; (58)
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where
ex xt;ekt;Htekt = 


x


 1
t H
( 1)

t
ekt1  and xt = t mt;ekt :
Di¤erentiating (58) with respect to mt gives
@2t

mt;ekt
@m2t
=  



  1
 ht mt;ekti 2H ( 1)t ekt1 
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
h
(1  ) z + ex xt;ekt;Htekti2
24@t

mt;ekt
@mt
35 < 0;
as  > 1 > : Hence, the payo¤ function in (57) is strictly concave in mt: Let S1;t be the set
of
emt;ekt under which mt  dt, and let S2;t be the set of emt;ekt under which mt < dt.
Then, the buyers expected value can be expressed as
V bt (mt; kt) =
Z
S1;t
Wt

mt   dt; kt + z
ektH1 t  dFt emt;ekt
+
Z
S2;t
Wt

0; kt + zt

mt;ekt dFt emt;ekt :
The above results imply that V bt (mt; kt) is separable in its arguments, linear in kt and strictly
concave in mt: Hence, it is jointly strictly concave in (mt; kt) :
Next, consider a seller in the DM at time t with assets (mt; kt) : Again, depending on
whom he trade with, there are two possible bargaining outcomes: (i) emt  dt and (ii) emt < dt;
where dt is now given by
dt (kt)  pt [1 + (1   k) rt]

(1  ) zktH1 t + kt

;
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where we highlight its dependence on kt: Since  2 (0; 1) ; dt (kt) is strictly concave in kt: Ifemt  dt (kt), then the sellers payo¤ is
Wt
 
mt + dt; (1  ) kt

= Wt (mt; kt) +Wm;tdt (kt) W k;tkt:
This payo¤ function is linear inmt and strictly concave in kt: If emt < dt (kt) ; then the sellers
payo¤ is
Wt (mt + emt; kt   t (emt; kt)) = W (mt; kt) +Wm;t emt  W k;tt (emt; kt) ; (59)
where
t (emt; kt) = e (t (emt; kt) ; kt;Ht) kt =  [t (emt; kt)] H ( 1)t k1 t : (60)
The payo¤ function in (59) is separable in (mt; kt) and linear in mt: It is strictly concave
in kt if and only if t (emt; kt) is strictly convex in kt for any emt > 0: Since t (emt; kt) is
a strictly positive real-valued function, it is strictly convex in kt if ln [t (emt; kt)] is strictly
convex in kt: Using (60), we can get
ln [t (emt; kt)] = ln H ( 1)t +  ln [t (emt; kt)]  (   1) ln kt:
Since   (   1) ln kt is strictly convex, it su¢ ce to show that ln [t (emt; kt)] is strictly convex
in kt: For ease of exposition, we will adopt the following simplied notation in the remaining
part of the proof, et  e (t (emt; kt) ; kt;Ht) ;
ex;t  ex (t (emt; kt) ; kt;Ht) = 

et
t (emt; kt) > 0; (61)
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ek;t  ek (t (emt; kt) ; kt;Ht) =  et
kt
< 0:
It is important to note the di¤erence between the partial derivative ek;t and the following
total derivative
det
dkt
= ex;t @t (emt; kt)
@kt

+ ek;t:
Using these notations, we can write
@t (emt; kt)
@kt
= kt
det
dkt
+ et:
Using (77), we can obtain
@ ln [t (emt; kt)]
@kt
=
1
t (emt; kt) @t (emt; kt)@kt =  (   1)ett (emt; kt) h(1  ) z + ex;tkti : (62)
Using (61), we can express the denominator of the above expression as
t = (1  ) zt (emt; kt) +  

etkt
= (1  ) zt (emt; kt) + etkt +  

  1
etkt
=
emt
pt [1 + (1   k) rt] + 


  1
etkt:
The third line follows from (40). Di¤erentiating the expression in (62) with respect to kt
again gives
@2 ln [t (emt; kt)]
@k2t
=
 (   1)
2t
" 
det
dkt
!
t   


  1
et kt det
dkt
+ et!# :
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The expression inside the square brackets can be simplied to become
emt
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
 
det
dkt
!
  


  1
e2t
=
emt
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
ex;t @t (emt; kt)
@kt

+ ek;t   

  1
e2t :
Since ek;t < 0; it su¢ ce to show that
emt
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
ex;t @t (emt; kt)
@kt

  


  1
e2t < 0:
Using
emt
pt [1 + (1   k) rt] = t   


  1
etkt and ex;t = 

et
t (emt; kt) ;
we can get
emt
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]
ex;t @t (emt; kt)
@kt

  


  1
e2t
=
h
t   


  1
etkti 

"
 (   1)e2t
t
#
  


  1
e2t
=
e2t
t
h
t   


  1
etkti  (   1)

 


  1

t

=
e2t
t

 (   1)

 


  1

t   


  1
  (   1)

etkt ;
which is strictly negative if ( 1)

  

  1 : The latter is equivalent to    (2  ) : This
proves that the payo¤ function in (59) is strictly concave in kt:
Let bS1;t be the set of emt;ekt under which emt  dt, and let bS2;t be the set of emt;ekt
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under which emt < dt. Then, the sellers expected value can be expressed as
V st (mt; kt) =
Z
bS1;tWt
 
mt + dt; (1  ) kt

dFt
emt;ekt
+
Z
bS2;tWt (mt + emt; kt   t (emt; kt)) dFt
emt;ekt :
The above results imply that V st (mt; kt) is separable in its arguments, linear in mt and
strictly concave in kt: Hence, it is also jointly strictly concave in (mt; kt) : This completes the
proof of Proposition 3.
2.4.2 Derivations of (50)-(54)
Since Kt = kt; bKt = bkt; Mt = mt and Lt = lt for all t  0 in equilibrium, we will use
the lowercase variables and uppercase variables interchangeably in this section. Dene the
transformed variable t  kt=Ht: Then we can write
xt
Ht
=

st  kt
Ht

) xt
Ht
= (stt)
 ;
ex;tkt = 

 etkt
xt
!
=



st t
(stt)


= e  s t 1 t  ;
where e  = > 0: Using these expressions, we can express the partial derivatives of
t (mt; kt) as
@t (mt; kt)
@mt
=
1
pt [1 + (1   k) rt]

(1  ) z + es t 1 t  ;
@t (mt; kt)
@kt
=
 (   1) st
(1  ) z + es t 1 t :
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Next, we need to derive an expression for @t (mt; kt) =@kt: This is given by
@t (mt; kt)
@kt
= kt
ex;t@t (mt; kt)
@kt
+ ek;t+ et
= et  (   1)ex;tkt
(1  ) z + ex;tkt   (   1) et
=  (1  ) z (   1)
et
(1  ) z + ex;tkt =   (1  ) z (   1) s

t
(1  ) z + es t 1 t < 0:
The Euler equations in (44) and (45) can now be rewritten as
pt+1ct+1
ptct
= 

1  + z
(1  ) z + es t+1 1 t+1

; (63)
ct+1
ct
=  [1 + (1   k) rt+1]

1 + (1  ) (   1) st+1

z
(1  ) z + es t+1 1 t+1

: (64)
In a balanced-growth equilibrium, we have st = s and t =  for all t: In addition, all
nominal variables must be growing at the same rate as : Hence, (63) can be rewritten as
1 +  = 

1  + z
(1  ) z + e (s)  ()1 

) 1 +    (1  )

=
z
(1  ) z + e (s)  ()1  (65)
) (s)  ()1  = z
e


1 +    (1  )   (1  )

 z
 () ;
which is equation (50) in the main text. This equation also implies
(s)  = z
 () (s) : (66)
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Similarly, after imposing the conditions for a balanced-growth equilibrium, (64) can be
rewritten as
1 +  =  [1 + (1   k) (R   )]

1 + (1  ) (   1)  (s)

z
(1  ) z + e (s)  ()1 

=  [1 + (1   k) (R   )]

1 + (1  ) (   1)  (s)

1 +    (1  )


;
which is equation (51) in the main text. Note that we have used (65) in order to derive the
second equality.
Dene the transformed variable bt  bKt=Ht: From the representative rms rst-order
conditions, we can get
Rt = %
bt
lt
% 1
and
wt
Ht
= (1  %)
bt
lt
%
;
which imply bt
lt
=

%
Rt
 1
1 %
) wt
Ht
= (1  %)

%
Rt
 %
1 %
; (67)
lt =

Rt
%
 1
1 % bt;
wtlt
Ht
= (1  %) (bt)% (lt)1 % and Rt bKt
Ht
= % (bt)% (lt)1 % :
From the rst-order condition of the consumers problem, we have
ct =
(1   l)wt
(1 +  c)A
) ct
Ht
=
(1   l) (1  %)
(1 +  c)A| {z }
B

%
Rt
 %
1 %
:
The second equality follows from the expression in (67). Next, consider the governments
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budget constraint in (46). Dividing both sides by Ht gives
 c

ct
Ht

+ [ l (1  %) +  k%  v] (bt)% (lt)1 %    kbt = Ht+1
Ht
  (1  h)
)  c

ct
Ht

+ [ l (1  %) +  k%  v]

Rt
%
bt    kbt = Ht+1
Ht
  (1  h)
)  c

ct
Ht

+
e Rt
%

   k
bt = Ht+1
Ht
  (1  h) ;
where e   l (1  %) +  k%   v: In a balanced-growth equilibrium, the above expression
becomes
 cB
 %
R
 %
1 %
+
e R
%

   k
b =  + h;
which is equation (52).
Finally, consider the equilibrium dynamics of Kt and bKt: Dividing both sides of (48) by
Ht gives bt = Kt
Ht
+ 

z

xt
Ht

  st t

= vt +  [z (stt)
   st t] :
As shown in (66), in a balanced-growth equilibrium, we have (s)  = z
 () (s) :
Hence, we can obtain
b =  + [1  
 ()]z (s) ;
which is equation (53) in the text. Dividing both sides of (49) by Ht gives
ct
Ht
+
Kt+1
Ht+1
Ht+1
Ht
  (1  )bt + Ht+1
Ht
  (1  h) = (1  v) (bt)% (lt)1 % :
Equation (54) can be obtained after imposing the conditions for a balanced-growth equilib-
rium.
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3 Chapter 3 Progressive Taxation, Inequality and Growth
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we examine theoretically the long-run macroeconomic e¤ects of inequality,
and the role of progressive taxation in determining these e¤ects. The same topics have been
previously studied by Li and Sarte (2004) and Carroll and Young (2011) among others. Most
of the existing studies, however, focus on specic forms of the progressive tax function. The
present study departs from this literature by considering a general tax function and examine
how the general properties of this function will a¤ect the relationship between inequality
and economic development. We show that in a variety of model environments the concavity
of the marginal tax function (i.e., the third derivative of the progressive tax function) plays
a crucial role in determining the relationship between inequality and economic growth.
In Section 1 of this chapter, we present our baseline analytical framework, which is a dy-
namic general equilibrium model in which consumers di¤er in terms of their time preferences
and labor productivity. Both labor income and interest income are subject to a progressive
income tax. In the baseline model, there is no long-term economic growth. The main pur-
pose of this section is to examine the e¤ects of consumer heterogeneity on the steady-state
value of per-capita capital. To this end, we compare the steady state in the heterogeneous-
agent (HA) economy to that of an identical-agent (IA) economy. Inequality is said to be
benecial (or harmful) to long-run capital accumulation if the HA steady state has more
(or less) physical capital than its IA counterpart. Our main result shows that inequality
is benecial (or harmful) to long-run capital accumulation if and only if the marginal tax
function is concave (or convex).
In Section 2, we generalize this result in two ways: First, we show that the main re-
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sult holds in an environment in which long-term economic growth exists and is driven by
an exogenously growing productivity factor. Second, we extend our analysis to a class of
endogenous growth model and show that inequality is benecial (or harmful) to long-term
economic growth in and only if the marginal tax function is concave (or convex).
3.2 The Baseline Model
3.2.1 Consumers
Time is discrete and is denoted by t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g : The economy under study is inhabited by a
continuum of innitely-lived consumers which di¤er in terms of their innate characteristics.
Specically, there are S > 1 di¤erent types of consumers. Each type i 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg is
identied by a pair of xed predetermined characteristics (i; "i) ; where i 2 (0; 1) is the
subjective discount factor and "i > 0 is labor productivity.23 Consumers within the same
group are identical in all aspects. The share of type-i consumers in the population is given
by i 2 (0; 1) : The size of total population is constant over time and is normalized to one
so that
PS
i=1 i = 1: For future reference, we also dene " 
PS
i=1 i"i as the average labor
productivity and i  1=i   1 as the rate of time preference for a type-i consumer.
There is a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and
investment. All consumers have preferences over consumption sequences which can be rep-
resented by
1X
t=0
tiu (ci;t) ; (68)
where ci;t is the consumption of a type-i consumer at time t: The utility function u : R+ ! R
is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and
23Heterogeneity in labor productivity is not essential for our main results. We include this feature just to
make our analysis more general.
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satises the Inada condition: lim
c!0
u0 (c) = +1:
In each period, each consumer is endowed with one unit of time which they supply
inelastically to work. The labor income for a type-i consumer is given by wt"i; where wt is
the wage rate for an e¤ective unit of labor at time t. The consumers can save by holding
a single risk-free asset. Let ai;t be the amount of assets owned by the consumer at the
beginning of time t: The interest income generated by these assets is rtai;t; where rt is the
rate of return. The sum of these two types of income, denoted by yi;t  wt"i+rtai;t; is subject
to a progressive income tax. Specically, the amount of tax that the consumer has to pay is
determined by a function  : R+ ! R+; which is thrice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly convex and satises  (0) = 0: The consumer also receives a lump-sum
transfer i;t from the government which is not subject to tax. Thus, the net taxes that the
consumer has to pay is given by e t (yi;t)   (yi;t) + i;t; which can be either positive or
negative. The consumers budget constraint at time t is then given by
ci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t = yi;t    (yi;t) + i;t: (69)
Taking prices and the income tax schedule as given, the consumersproblem is to choose a
sequence of consumption and asset holdings so as to maximize his lifetime utility in (68),
subject to the sequential budget constraint in (69). The Euler equation for this problem is
given by
u0 (ci;t) = iu
0 (ci;t+1) f1 + rt+1 [1   0 (yi;t+1)]g : (70)
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3.2.2 Production
On the supply side of the economy, there is a large number of identical rms. In each period,
each rm hires labor and rents physical capital from the competitive factor markets, and
produces output using a neoclassical production technology
Yt = F (Kt; Nt) ;
where Yt denotes output at time t; Kt and Nt denote capital input and labor input, respec-
tively. The production function F : R2+ ! R+ is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave in (Kt; Nt) ; exhibits constant returns to scale in the two
inputs and satises the Inada conditions. Let Rt be the rental price of physical capital at
time t. Then the representative rm solves the following problem
max
Kt;Nt
fF (Kt; Nt)  wtNt  RtKtg ;
and the rst-order conditions are
Rt = FK (Kt; Nt) ; and wt = FN (Kt; Nt) :
3.2.3 Government
The tax revenues collected by the government are either spent on unproductive government
spending (Gt) or distributed as transfers to the consumers.24 The governments budget is
24Government spending Gt is called unproductivebecause it has no direct e¤ect on consumersutility
and the production of goods.
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balanced in every period, so that
SX
i=1
i (yi;t) = Gt +
SX
i=1
ii;t; for all t: (71)
3.2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
To dene a competitive equilibrium, we rst dene ct = (c1;t; c2;t; :::; cS;t) and at = (a1;t; a2;t; :::; aS;t)
as the cross-sectional distributions of consumption and asset holdings at time t: The exoge-
nous policy variables in this economy include the progressive tax function  () and a sequence
of unproductive government spending fGtg1t=0 : Given these policy variables, a competitive
equilibrium of this economy consists of sequences of distributions fct; atg1t=0 ; aggregate in-
puts fKt; Ntg1t=0 ; prices fwt; rt; Rtg1t=0 and transfers fi;tg1t=0 such that
(i) Given prices and government policies, fci;t; ai;tg1t=0 solves a type-i consumers problem.
(ii) Given prices, fKt; Ntg1t=0 solves the representative rms problem in every period.
(iii) The governments budget is balanced in every period.
(iv) All markets clear in every period, so that Kt =
PS
i=1 iai;t; and Nt =
PS
i=1 i"i  ";
for all t:
We focus on the stationary equilibria or steady states of this economy. In this type of
equilibria, both the unproductive government spending and lump-sum transfers are time-
invariant. Dene kt = Kt=Nt: In any steady state, the equilibrium prices are given by
r = FK (k; 1)   and w = FN (k; 1) and the Euler equation becomes
1 = i f1 + r [1   0 (yi )]g )  0 (yi ) = 1 
i
r
; (72)
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where i  1=i 1: Let  () be the inverse of the marginal tax function, i.e.,  [ 0 (y)] = y for
all y  0: Since  0 () is strictly monotone, its inverse is a well-dened single-valued function.
Straightforward di¤erentiation yields 0 [ 0 (y)] = [ 00 (y)] 1 > 0 and
00 [ 0 (y)] =  
0 [ 0 (y)]  000 (y)
[ 00 (y)]2
? 0 if and only if  000 (y) 7 0:
The above expression shows a close connection between the third derivative of the progres-
sive tax function  () and the concavity of  () : Specically, a positive (or negative) third
derivative of  () means that  () is a concave (or convex) function. Equation (72) can be
used to obtain
yi = w
"i + rai = 

1  i
r

:
Summing the above expression across all types of consumers gives
SX
i=1
i

1  i
r

= " [F (k; 1)  k] ; (73)
where r = FK (k; 1)   : Equation (73) can be used to solve for a unique value of k:25
Note that this steady-state value is independent of the heterogeneity in labor productivity.
Once k is known, all other variables including w; r and per-capita output F (k; 1) can be
uniquely determined. It follows that all these variables are independent of the heterogeneity
in labor productivity.
25The uniqueness of k is formally established in the proof of Proposition 3.
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3.2.5 Main Result
We now examine the e¤ects of consumer heterogeneity on the steady-state value k; and the
role of progressive taxation in determining these e¤ects. In what follows, we will refer to
the economy with consumer heterogeneity as the heterogeneous-agent (HA) economy and
the solution of (73) as the HA steady state. Our goal is to compare this to the steady-state
value implied by an economy with identical agents (IA). The IA economy is a special case
of the above economy with i =  
PS
j=1 ij > 0; "i = " and i;t = t 
PS
j=1 ij;t for
all i and for all t: All other aspects of the IA economy are identical to its heterogeneous-
agent counterpart. In particular, the two economies share the same production technology,
progressive tax function and unproductive government spending.
Let k

be the steady-state value of capital-labor ratio in the IA economy. This value is
uniquely determined by


1  
r

= "
h
F

k

; 1

  k
i
; (74)
where r = FK

k

; 1

  . Since the HA economy and IA economy are identical except for
the presence or absence of consumer heterogeneity, the di¤erence between k and k

thus
indicates the long-run e¤ects of consumer inequality. Specically, inequality is said to be
harmful (or benecial) to long-term capital accumulation if k < k

(or k > k

). The main
result of this section (Proposition 3) shows that the long-run e¤ects of inequality depend
crucially on the third derivative of the progressive tax function. The proof of this and other
results can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Consumer heterogeneity is benecial to long-term capital accumulation if
and only if the progressive tax function has negative third derivative, i.e., k > k

if and only
if  000 () < 0:
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Discussions In the existing studies on progressive taxation, two specic forms of tax
function are commonly used. The rst one is an isoelastic function that has been used in
Guo and Lansing (1998), Li and Sarte (2004) and many subsequent studies. This type of
function can be represented by
 (y) = y1+;
with  > 0 and  > 0: One distinctive feature of this function is that the ratio between the
marginal tax rate  0 (y) and average tax rate  (y) =y is captured by (1 + ). The ratio is
often used as a measure of progressivity of the tax schedule.26 Under this specication, the
marginal tax function is given by
 0 (y) =  (1 + ) y;
which is strictly concave (or strictly convex) if  < 1 (or  > 1). Using tax returns data in
the United States, Li and Sarte (2011) estimate that the value of  in 1985 and 1991 are
0.88 and 0.75, respectively, and they use these values in their computations. Thus, in their
quantitative analysis, the marginal tax function is strictly concave, i.e.,  000 () < 0:
Another commonly used tax function is the one proposed and estimated by Gouveia and
Strauss (1994),
 (y) = a0
h
y    y a1 + a2  1a1 i :
This functional form has been used in Sarte (1997), Conesa and Krueger (2006), Erosa and
Koreshkova (2007), Carroll and Young (2011) among others. The rst, second and third-
26Technically, (1 + ) is the elasticity of the tax function with respect to y; i.e., y 0 (y) = (y) = 1 +  for
all y  0:
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order derivatives of this tax function are
 0 (y) = a0

1  (1 + a2ya1) 

1+ 1
a1

;
 00 (y) = a0a2 (1 + a1) (1 + a2ya1)
 

2+ 1
a1

ya1 1;
 000 (y) =
 00 (y)
y

a1   1  (2a1 + 1)

a2y
a1
1 + a2ya1

: (75)
In all existing applications, the parameters a0, a1 and a2 are taken to be strictly positive so
as to ensure  00 (y) > 0: Gouveia and Strauss (1994) estimate that the value of in the U.S.
system a1 is about 0.768. Similar values are also used in Sarte (1997) and Conesa and Krueger
(2006). From (75), it is obvious that 0 < a1  1 implies  000 () < 0: In their quantitative
analysis, Carroll and Young (2011) have also considered counterfactual experiments in which
a1 > 1: In this case, there exists a unique threshold value of income below which  000 (y) > 0
and above which  000 (y) < 0:
3.3 Extensions
3.3.1 Exogenous Growth
In this section, we show that the results in Proposition 3 can be easily extended to an
economy with exogenous productivity growth. To achieve this, we make three changes to
the economy described above. First, the production technology is now given by
Yt = F (Kt; XtNt) ;
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where Xt is a labor-augmenting technological factor. This factor is assumed to grow by a
constant factor  > 1 in every period, so that Xt = t for all t: The production function
F () is assumed to have the same properties as before. Second, in order to be consistent
with balanced growth, the period utility function is now assumed to take the CRRA form,
i.e.,
u (c) =
c1 
1   ;
where  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Finally, we need
to ensure that the marginal tax rate is constant along the balanced growth path. To achieve
this, we assume that the progressive tax function is now changing over time and is denoted
by Tt (yi;t) ; and the marginal tax function exhibits the following property:
T 0t (yi;t) = 
0

yi;t
t

; for all t  0:
As before, the function  0 () : R+ ! [0; 1] is twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing. Dene the transformed variables: kt  Kt= (XtNt) ; and byi;t  yi;t=t: The Euler
equation for consumption is now given by

ci;t+1
ci;t

= i f1 + rt+1 [1   0 (byi;t+1)]g ;
where rt+1 = FK (kt+1; 1)  : In any balanced-growth equilibrium, we have kt = k; ci;t+1 =
ci;t and byi;t = byi for all t: Thus, (72) is now modied to become
 = i f1 + r [1   0 (byi )]g )  0 (byi ) = 1  1r [ (1 + i)  1] :
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Dening  () as the inverse of  0 () and summing across all types of consumers give
SX
i=1
i

1  1
r
[ (1 + i)  1]

= " [F (k; 1)  k] :
We will again refer to the solution of this equation as the HA steady state. The IA steady
state

k

is characterized by


1  1
r
[ (1 + )  1]

= "
h
F

k

; 1

  k
i
;
where r = FK

k

; 1

  :
The main result of this section is Proposition 4 which extends the result in Proposition
3 to this environment. The main ideas of the two proofs are essentially identical, hence the
proof of Proposition 4 is omitted.
Proposition 4 In the model with exogenous productivity growth, Consumer heterogeneity
is benecial to long-term capital accumulation if and only if the progressive tax function has
negative third derivative, i.e., k > k

if and only if  000 () < 0:
3.3.2 Endogenous Growth
We now generalize our main result to an economy with endogenous growth. The model
is essentially identical to the one considered in Li and Sarte (2004, Section II). There are
two types of commodities in this economy: a consumption good (Ct) and an investment
good (It) : As in Li and Sarte (2004), the consumption good is produced by a Cobb-Douglas
production function
Ct = BK

c;tN
1 
c;t ; with B > 0 and  2 (0; 1) ; (76)
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where Kc;t and Nc;t denote capital input and labor input, respectively. Investment good is
produced by a linear technology that only uses physical capital as input, i.e.,
It = AKI;t; with A > 0;
where KI;t denote the amount of capital input in the investment-good sector. Firms in both
sectors rent the inputs from the competitive factor markets. Let Rt be the rental price of
physical capital and wt be the market wage rate. Then the rst-order conditions from the
rmsproblem are given by
Rt = A = BK
 1
c;t N
1 
c;t and wt = (1  )BKc;tN c;t :
The consumers problem is essentially identical to the one in the baseline model. Specif-
ically, a type-i consumer solves the following problem
max
fci;t;ai;t+1g1t=0
" 1X
t=0
ti
 
c1 i;t
1  
!#
subject to the sequential budget constraint
qtci;t + ai;t+1   ai;t = yi;t   Tt (yi;t) + i;t;
where qt is the price of consumption good expressed in units of investment good. Unlike Li
and Sarte (2004), we do not impose a specic functional form on Tt () : However, in order
to ensure that the marginal tax function is constant along the balanced growth path, we
89
assume that the marginal tax function satises the following property:
T 0t (yi;t) = 
0

yi;t
Yt

; for all t  0;
where Yt =
PS
i=1 iyi;t: The Euler equation for consumption is now given by
qt+1
qt

ci;t+1
ci;t

= i

1 + rt+1

1   0

yi;t
Yt

;
for all i and for all t  0:
In equilibrium, the markets for physical capital and labor are cleared in every period so
that
Kc;t +KI;t =
SX
i=1
iai;t and Nc;t =
SX
i=1
i"i:
In any balanced-growth equilibria, Kc;t; KI;t and Yt grow by the same factor in every period.
The common growth factor is endogenously determined and is denoted by : Since Nc;t is
a xed factor, it follows from (76) that the growth factor of Ct is given by ()
 : Since total
consumption expenditures (qtCt) must be growing at the same rate as aggregate income, the
growth factor of qt is ()
1  : Along any balanced-growth path, the net rate of return from
asset holdings is given by r = A   > 0: Using these, we can express the Euler equation as
()1 (1 ) = i f1 + (A  ) [1   0 ( i )]g ; for all i; (77)
where  i  yi;t=Yt: Dene  () as the inverse of  0 () : Then we can rewrite the above
equation as
 i = 
 
1  1
A  
"
()1 (1 )
i
  1
#!
:
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Summing across all types of consumers gives
SX
i=1
i 

i =
SX
i=1
i
 
1  1
A  
"
()1 (1 )
i
  1
#!
= 1: (78)
This provides a single equation that relates the endogenous growth factor  and the con-
sumer heterogeneity f1; :::; Sg : In the following analysis, we will refer to  as the HA
growth factor. The growth factor in the IA world is denoted by  and is completely char-
acterized by

 
1  1
A  
"
()1 (1 )

  1
#!
= 1:
In order to ensure equation (78) has a unique solution, we need to impose some additional
conditions. To start, we assume e  1   (1  ) > 0; which is satised when   1: Next,
we assume that
(1 + A  ) min > max; (79)
where min and max are the minimum and maximum values of f1; :::; Sg ; respectively.
Then dene  and  according to
  [(1 + A  ) min]
1e and   (max)
1e :
Since e > 0; the condition in (79) ensures that  ;  is a nonempty interval. As we will show
in the proof of Proposition 5, any solution of (78) must be contained in this interval. Thus,
condition (79) is essential for the existence of balanced-growth equilibria. Finally, dene the
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function  :
 
; 
! R+ according to
 () 
SX
i=1
i

1  1
A  

e
i
  1

:
Proposition 5 states that consumer heterogeneity is benecial to long-term economic growth
if and only if  000 () < 0:
Proposition 5 Suppose e  1    (1  ) > 0 and (1 + A  ) min > max: In addition,
suppose 
 


> 1 >  () : Then equation (78) has a unique solution : Furthermore, con-
sumer heterogeneity is benecial to long-term economic growth if and only if the progressive
tax function has negative third derivative, i.e.,  >  if and only if  000 () < 0:
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3.4 Appendix
3.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Dene the reduced-form production function f (k)  F (k; 1) for all k  0: Dene the
function  (k)  " [f (k)  k] ; which is the left side of (73). Since f () is strictly increasing
and strictly concave, there exists a unique value kGR > 0 such that 0 (k) ? 0 if and only if
k 7 kGR: Next, consider (72) and (73). Since  0 (y)  0 for all y  0; equation (72) essentially
imposes a restriction on the steady-state value r; which is r  max  max

1;2; :::; S
	
:
By the strict concavity of f () and the Inada conditions lim
k!0
f 0 (k) = 1 and lim
k!1
f 0 (k) = 0,
there exists a unique value kmax 2 (0; kGR) such that
f 0 (kmax) =  + max:
Note that r  max if and only if k  kmax: Thus, any solution of (73) must be contained
in the range (0; kmax) : Dene the function   : (0; kmax)! R+ according to
  (k) 
SX
i=1
i

1  i
f 0 (k)  

:
Straightforward di¤erentiation shows that   () is strictly decreasing over (0; kmax) : In ad-
dition, as k approaches zero,   (k) tends to  (1) > 0 =  (0) : As k approaches kmax;   (k)
becomes
PS
i=1 i (1  i=max) > 0: A solution of (73) exists if and only if
 (kmax) >
SX
i=1
i

1  i
max

:
93
In addition, a solution if exists must be unique. A graphical illustration of this is shown in
Figure A1.
Figure A1: Existence and Uniqueness of Steady State.
We now turn to the comparison between k and k

: The latter is the solution of (74) and
its uniqueness can be established by using a similar argument as above. If  () is a strictly
concave function, which is equivalent to  000 () > 0; then we have
SX
i=1
i

1  i
r

< 

1  
r

= 

k

:
Using Figure A1, it is immediate to see this condition is valid if and only if k

> k: If  ()
is strictly convex, then we have
SX
i=1
i

1  i
r

> 

1  
r

= 

k

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which hold if and only if k

< k: This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
3.4.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Since the marginal tax rate  0 () is restricted between zero and one, this essentially imposes
an upper bound and a lower bound on the equilibrium growth factor : To see this, rst
rewrite (77) as
 0 ( i ) = 1 
1
A  
"
()e
i
  1
#
;
where e  1   (1  ) > 0: Then  0 () > 0 implies
 < [(1 + A  ) i]
1e ; for all i:
Likewise,  0 () < 1 implies  > (i)
1e for all i: Thus, any solution of (78) must be contained
in the range
 
; 

:
Dene the function  :
 
; 
! R+ according to
 () 
SX
i=1
i

1  1
A  

e
i
  1

:
Straightforward di¤erentiation yields
0 ()   
ee 1
A  
 SX
i=1
i
i
0

1  1
A  

e
i
  1

< 0:
Thus,  () is strictly decreasing over the range  ;  : If    > 1 >  () ; then equation
(78) has a unique solution.
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If  () is a strictly convex function, i.e.,  000 () < 0; then we have
 () =
SX
i=1
i
 
1  1
A  
"
()1 (1 )
i
  1
#!
> 
 
1  1
A  
"
()1 (1 )

  1
#!
= 1:
The second line is obtained by Jensens inequality. Since  () is strictly decreasing, this
means  < : This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
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